Warner v Scapa Flow Charters

Under article 16(3) of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974, domestic grounds for the suspension of limitation periods include rules which postpone the commencement of a period as well as rules which stop time after it has begun to run.

The domestic rule need not expressly extend beyond the domestic limitation regime. A legal disability recognised by the law of the forum may therefore suspend the Convention's two-year period. Any such suspension remains subject to the Convention's absolute three-year long stop.

A passenger died while participating in a diving expedition from a vessel operated by Scapa Flow Charters. His widow sought damages for herself and, as guardian, for their young son. The Lord Ordinary held that both claims were barred by the two-year limitation period in article 16 of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974.

The Inner House, in [2017] CSIH 13, upheld the dismissal of the widow's individual claim but held that the son's minority suspended the Convention period under article 16(3). The carrier appealed. The issue was whether the domestic grounds of suspension incorporated by article 16(3) include a rule which prevents time from running because the claimant was already under a legal disability when the limitation period began.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Hodge delivered the judgment, with which Lady Hale, Lord Reed, Lord Sumption and Lord Briggs agreed. The son's claim was not time-barred.

2. An international convention must be interpreted by considering the objective meaning of its words and the purpose of the convention as a whole. Its language must be construed on broad principles capable of producing a generally acceptable and internationally uniform result. Domestic legal classifications cannot rigidly control that interpretation.

3. The expression “grounds of suspension” in article 16(3) of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 is wide enough to include domestic rules which postpone the commencement of a limitation period. Comparative materials demonstrated that “suspension” had not acquired the narrower, uniform technical meaning for which the carrier contended. The proposed narrow construction would also produce arbitrary differences according to whether a claimant's minority or mental incapacity began before or after the Convention period commenced.

4. Article 16(3) refers the court to the law of the forum for the grounds on which limitation periods may be suspended or interrupted. A domestic ground need not be drafted so as expressly to apply to limitation periods imposed by international conventions. The contrary tentative view in Higham v Stena Sealink Ltd was rejected.

5. Section 18(3) of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 requires time during which a relative is under legal disability by reason of non-age or unsoundness of mind to be disregarded. Its statutory mechanism suspends time from the starting point fixed by section 18(2). In any event, a rule postponing commencement would fall within the international meaning of suspension.

6. The son's minority was therefore a domestic ground of suspension which operated on the two-year Convention period beginning when the passenger should have disembarked. The suspension could not, however, permit proceedings after the absolute three-year long stop imposed by article 16(3). The proceedings had been commenced within that long stop.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: In [2018] UKSC 52, unanimously dismissed the carrier's appeal and affirmed that the claim brought for the child was not time-barred.
2. Inner House of the Court of Session: In [2017] CSIH 13, upheld the dismissal of the widow's individual claim but reversed the Lord Ordinary's order concerning the claim brought as guardian, holding that claim was not time-barred.
3. Lord Ordinary: Upheld the carrier's time-bar defence and dismissed both claims.