Begum v Ahmed

Under section 4 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, the court’s unfettered discretion to permit a late family-provision claim must be exercised consistently with the statutory purpose of avoiding prejudicial delay in administering and distributing estates. The Salmon guidelines are relevant but non-exhaustive. No factor, including the balance of prejudice, is invariably decisive.

The court should assess the actual effect of delay, the parties’ prejudice, any notice of the claim, alternative remedies, and the merits. It should not import the procedural discipline applicable under the CPR. Where undisputed facts reveal a strong claim and delay has caused no real prejudice, permission may be just and proper despite an inadequate explanation for delay.

The appellant, the deceased’s widow, had lived in the estate’s only asset, a house, for many years. The deceased’s 2014 will left the estate to his daughter, the respondent. Probate was granted on 11 April 2016.

Before the six-month statutory period expired, solicitors notified the respondent that the appellant contemplated both a claim for reasonable financial provision and a challenge to the will’s validity. No timely statutory claim followed. The appellant later sought permission under section 4 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 to bring the claim out of time.

A District Judge refused permission, and HHJ McCahill QC upheld that decision. The central issue was whether the exercise of discretion had been flawed and, if so, whether an extension should be granted afresh.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Justice Floyd, with whom Lady Justice King and Lord Justice Henderson agreed, held that the District Judge’s discretionary decision was materially flawed. The orders of the District Judge and Circuit Judge were set aside, and the appellant was granted an extension of time under section 4 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

2. Section 4 confers an unfettered discretion, but it must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the statutory purpose. The six-month period protects the efficient administration of estates and avoids problems arising from distribution before a claim is made. The court must therefore consider whether the delay actually delayed administration or interfered with distributions. The Salmon guidelines are useful but non-exhaustive. The balance of prejudice is relevant, but no single factor is crucial in every case.

3. An applicant must have a real prospect of success. Where merits depend on disputed facts, the court should not conduct a mini-trial. Where undisputed facts permit a clear view, however, the strength of the substantive claim is properly weighed in deciding whether to extend time.

4. The District Judge erred by failing to analyse the effect of the delay. The will’s validity was already challenged, so the respondent could not obtain certainty or distribute the estate regardless of the delayed statutory claim. There was no evidence that an earlier claim would have changed the respondent’s conduct of the litigation.

5. The District Judge also wrongly discounted the serious prejudice to the appellant if she lost her long-standing home. Her separate will challenge was an entitlement she was entitled to pursue. Further, procedural mistakes by her solicitors did not make the delay itself more prejudicial or weightier. It was wrong to import considerations derived from CPR case-management jurisprudence.

6. On a fresh exercise of discretion, the claim had been notified within time, the unexplained delay caused no real prejudice, the appellant had a strong claim on undisputed facts, and any alternative remedy was uncertain. It was just and proper to extend time.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the second appeal and set aside the earlier orders: [2019] EWCA Civ 1794.
• County Court at Birmingham: District Judge Ingram refused an extension of time on 27 July 2018. HHJ McCahill QC refused the first appeal on 31 October 2018.