Kuznetsov v Amazon Services Europe SARL

A final judgment entered on a small-claims hearing may be set aside under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 where the applicant was absent and unrepresented and had not given notice of non-attendance. A company joined only at the hearing may satisfy those conditions if it was not previously a party or served, despite filing material on behalf of the named defendant. The 14-day period is extendable, so delay affects discretion rather than jurisdiction. Section 70 of the County Courts Act 1984 permits rules of court to prescribe exceptions to finality. The wider powers under the general case-management rules and inherent jurisdiction remained undecided.

Mr Alex Kuznetsov claimed damages after Amazon suspended and closed his seller’s account. He sued Amazon.co.uk, but the defence and evidence were prepared by Amazon Services Europe SARL and Amazon Payments Europe SCA. At the small-claims hearing on 15 September 2015, District Judge Fine joined the respondent as second defendant, dismissed the claim against Amazon.co.uk and entered judgment for the appellant against the respondent.

After amendments and a consolidation order, the district judge set aside that judgment on 21 December 2016. HHJ Parfitt upheld the decision on 22 September 2017. The second appeal concerned only whether the district judge had jurisdiction to set aside the earlier judgment, not how that discretion should be exercised.

1. Disposition. Floyd LJ gave the leading judgment. Lewison LJ and Sir Brian Leveson P agreed. The appeal was dismissed.
2. CPR rule 27.11. The respondent was not a party before the hearing. Amazon.co.uk was the only named defendant, and the respondent had not been served. The respondent therefore had not attended or been represented at the hearing and had not given a notice of non-attendance. It could satisfy the threshold conditions for an application under rule 27.11. Filing a defence and witness statement on behalf of Amazon.co.uk, and completing the directions questionnaire, did not amount to an unambiguous waiver or estoppel. Compliance with orders after joinder did not remove the right to rely on the rule.
3. Time and good reason. The 14-day period in rule 27.11(2), read with rule 3.1(2)(a), could be extended before or after expiry. The lapse of time therefore did not remove jurisdiction. The changed circumstances, including the consolidation of claims and the increase in the claimed value, could justify the implied extension, although the exercise of discretion was not under appeal. A non-party had a good reason for not attending, being represented or giving notice because it was not in a position to do any of those things. The reasonable-prospect requirement was not in issue.
4. Finality and human rights. Section 70 of the County Courts Act 1984, read with section 147, allowed rules of court to prescribe exceptions to finality. Rule 27.11 could therefore confer jurisdiction to set aside a final judgment. The existence of rule 39.3 supported that conclusion. The Article 1 Protocol 1 argument also failed: setting aside under rules of court was prescribed by law, and it would be disproportionate and contrary to the public interest for a £1,500 judgment to prevent a defence to later abusive claims valued at £100,000.
5. Unresolved alternative powers. It was unnecessary to decide the boundaries of rules 3.1(7), 3.1(2)(m) and the inherent jurisdiction to set aside final orders. The court cited Forcelux v Binnie [2009] EWCA Civ 854, Hackney LBC v Findlay [2011] EWCA Civ 8, Terry v BCS Acceptances and others [2018] EWCA Civ 2422 and Salekipour v Parma [2018] EWCA Civ 2141 as illustrating that those questions remained unresolved, without endorsing the lower court’s views.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). In [2019] EWCA Civ 964, the court dismissed the second appeal and held that the district judge had jurisdiction under CPR rule 27.11.
• County Court at Mayor’s and City of London. District Judge Fine entered judgment for the appellant against the respondent on 15 September 2015 and later set it aside on 21 December 2016. HHJ Parfitt confirmed the setting-aside decision on appeal on 22 September 2017.