Sargeant, R. v

For diminished responsibility, uncontradicted psychiatric evidence does not ordinarily require a judge to withdraw murder from the jury. Where there is a rational evidential basis to dispute substantial impairment of self-control or whether the abnormality explained the killing, those questions remain for the jury.

Under Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54, the objective limb of loss of control measures the defendant against a person with normal tolerance and self-restraint. A mental disorder cannot lower that standard merely because it affects general self-control, although it may be relevant to another aspect of the defendant’s circumstances, including the gravity of a qualifying trigger.

R v Golds does not prescribe fixed jury warnings in every diminished-responsibility case.

The appellant was convicted of murdering her mother at Stafford Crown Court and received a life sentence with a minimum term. She relied at trial on self-defence, absence of intent, loss of control and diminished responsibility. Her case was that longstanding abuse, autistic spectrum disorder, mild intellectual disability and adjustment disorder with post-traumatic-stress features had impaired her self-control.

The prosecution accepted the diagnoses but contended that the killing followed an argument about money and that the appellant’s conduct before and after it provided a rational basis to reject diminished responsibility. The appellant appealed against conviction on grounds concerning withdrawal of murder from the jury, expert evidence, directions on the deceased’s violent propensity and loss of control. The court also permitted a further ground concerning the diminished-responsibility direction.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to leave murder to the jury. The accepted diagnoses established an abnormality of mental functioning arising from recognised medical conditions. They did not compel findings that the appellant’s ability to exercise self-control was substantially impaired or that the abnormality caused or significantly contributed to the killing. Those were jury questions. The prosecution had a rational evidential basis for contesting them, including its case that this was a killing in anger following an argument about money and the appellant’s subsequent conduct. The case was not the rare case in which murder should be withdrawn despite the prosecution’s refusal to accept diminished responsibility.

2. The refusal to admit the experts’ joint statement was a permissible case-management decision. Its purpose had been to identify agreement between the experts. Its further evidential value was limited, its language raised factual questions, and the defence expert could have dealt with the matters in oral evidence. Its exclusion did not render the conviction unsafe.

3. No formal propensity direction concerning the deceased was required. The jury had a detailed agreed history of her aggression and violent behaviour. It provided an adequate basis to assess the circumstances of the killing.

4. The loss-of-control direction correctly applied section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and R v Rejmanski [2017] EWCA Crim 2061. The hypothetical person must have normal tolerance and self-restraint. The appellant’s mental disorders could not be used to reduce that objective standard merely because they affected her general capacity for self-control. Her history of abuse, isolation and feeling trapped could nevertheless be considered as circumstances, except to that excluded extent.

5. R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61 did not require a set of prescribed safety warnings in every diminished-responsibility trial. The essential requirement was that the jury should be told of the rational basis on which the prosecution invited rejection of the medical evidence. The summing-up did so, correctly directed the jury to assess all the evidence, and gave adequate warnings about expert evidence and the possible significance of the attack’s brutality.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): appeal against conviction dismissed: [2019] EWCA Crim 1088.
• Crown Court at Stafford: the appellant was convicted of murder on 5 October 2018 and sentenced to life imprisonment on 11 December 2018.