Chauhan & Anor, R. v

A judge may reserve reasons, but must provide them promptly. Where the defence’s conduct may depend on the reasons for rejecting a submission of no case, they must be given in time to permit informed decisions. The necessary detail depends on the circumstances. Brief reasons may suffice, but a ruling must adequately address the issue raised.

On an appeal against conviction, the principal questions are whether there was a case to answer and whether the conviction is safe. A statutory-conspiracy charge concerns the agreement and the parties’ intentions. The prosecution need not prove that the contemplated fraud was successfully carried out or that a particular transaction caused a provable loss.

The appellants were convicted at the Crown Court at Birmingham of separate counts of conspiracy to commit fraud by false representation concerning sales of properties owned by Severn Trent Water. The prosecution alleged that properties were sold through false markets at artificially low prices and were then resold for profit.

Chauhan was alleged to have acted as a front in purchases and bids. Croft was alleged to have joined a conspiracy concerning the sale of Waterworks Cottage and related proposed transactions. Both appealed against conviction, challenging the delayed and inadequate reasons for rejecting submissions of no case, the sufficiency of the evidence, and aspects of the summing-up. Croft also contended that his conviction was unsafe.

1. The appeals were dismissed. The judge’s failure promptly to provide reasons for rejecting the submissions of no case was unjustified. A judge may give a decision before detailed reasons, but reasons should be supplied as soon as possible. Their required extent depends on the decision and circumstances. Where the defence may need them to make informed decisions about its conduct, they must be available in time for that purpose.
2. The delayed reasons were scarcely sufficient. The mere recitation of the second limb of R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 and reference to prosecution skeleton arguments did not fully explain the ruling. Nevertheless, an appellate court will usually concentrate on whether there was in fact a case to answer and whether the conviction is safe. Here, the defence knew the prosecution case and suffered no material difficulty through the delay.
3. There was evidence on which a jury could properly find that Chauhan knowingly joined the alleged conspiracy. His role in purchases, bids and resales, including the use of false bids or valuations, entitled the jury to infer knowing and deceitful participation. There was likewise a case for Croft to answer, given the evidence about the false market, the transaction, the cash fee, the false invoice and his involvement in related dealings.
4. For statutory conspiracy, the prosecution had to prove an agreement, the intended criminal course of conduct, and the necessary intention or knowledge of each participant. The directions correctly reflected those requirements. In Croft’s case, proof that Waterworks was actually bought at an undervalue was evidentially relevant but was not a necessary element. Conspiracy is inchoate: the agreement and intent matter, rather than the eventual result.
5. There was no material misdirection in the summing-up. Nor did the sentencing judge’s difficulty in quantifying financial loss from the Waterworks transaction render Croft’s conviction unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appellants’ appeals against conviction: [2019] EWCA Crim 1111.
• Crown Court at Birmingham — on 1 August 2017, Chauhan and Croft were convicted by a jury of separate counts of conspiracy to commit fraud by false representation. On 20 October 2017, Croft received a 12-month community order and Chauhan received a suspended sentence order.