Dixon-Nash, R v

In sentencing a conspiracy to transfer firearms, the court must consider a life sentence and, if it is not imposed, impose a long determinate sentence. Sentences must reflect each offender’s role in the supply hierarchy, the nature and duration of the enterprise, the weapons and ammunition involved, and relevant antecedents.

Guideline sentences are a useful rangefinder, but sentencing remains intensely fact-specific. A granular comparison with another case is of limited value. Knowledge that transferred firearms will be used in gang violence is an aggravating feature of the transfer offence. Proper disparity must separate a leader from a facilitator, while a young person’s age and individual culpability require separate assessment.

Three members of one family were convicted at Wood Green Crown Court of conspiracy to transfer firearms contrary to the Criminal Law Act 1977. Meikiel Dixon-Nash, found to be the leader, received 20 years’ imprisonment. His mother, Claudette Dixon, found to be a key facilitator who stored and moved gang weapons, received 14 years. His younger brother, Melique Coote, aged 16 at the offending, received eight years’ detention.

All appealed on the ground that their sentences were manifestly excessive. The central issue was how the guidance in the Attorney General’s firearms-reference case applied to a local gang conspiracy involving fewer weapons but serious downstream gang violence.

1. The court allowed Claudette Dixon’s appeal, quashed her 14-year sentence and substituted 11 years’ imprisonment. It dismissed the appeals of Meikiel Dixon-Nash and Melique Coote.

2. The guidance in AG References Nos 128–141 of 2015 and Nos 8–10 of 2016 [2016] EWCA Crim 54 required the sentencing judge to consider life imprisonment for those dealing in lethal weapons and, if it was not imposed, to impose a long determinate sentence proportionate to each offender’s place in the supply enterprise. The court also endorsed the deterrent rationale stated in R v Wilkinson [2009] EWCA Crim 1925.

3. The guidance case provided an indicative rangefinder, not a substitute for an assessment of the whole factual context. A detailed comparison between cases had limited utility. Here, although the enterprise was more local and involved fewer weapons than the guidance case, Dixon-Nash was the directing mind, had participated in a long-running gang vendetta and downstream violence, recruited family members, and had relevant convictions and bad-character evidence. The judge was entitled to treat those matters as aggravating. A 20-year sentence was neither excessive nor manifestly excessive.

4. The judge had not conflated transfer of firearms with possession with intent to endanger life when sentencing Claudette Dixon. Her knowledge that the weapons were intended for gang violence was relevant aggravation of the transfer conspiracy. However, she was the least culpable appellant. A 14-year sentence did not sufficiently reflect the difference between her facilitating role and the leader’s appropriate 18-year starting point before aggravation. Eleven years produced a proper hierarchical disparity.

5. Coote had been materially more involved than his mother, including in transfers, storage and post-shooting activity. The judge had considered the definitive guidelines for children and young people. Any limited differential from the leader was adequately addressed by an age-related reduction approaching 50 per cent, and the eight-year sentence was not manifestly excessive. The court also clarified that, because Coote was under 18 at conviction, the technically appropriate form of sentence was detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). In [2019] EWCA Crim 1173, dismissed the sentence appeals of Meikiel Dixon-Nash and Melique Coote; allowed Claudette Dixon’s appeal and substituted 11 years’ imprisonment.
• Wood Green Crown Court. Following a trial, convicted the respondents of conspiracy to transfer firearms and imposed sentences of 20 years’ imprisonment, 14 years’ imprisonment, and eight years’ detention respectively.