Bitton, R. v

In sentencing offences of publishing material intended to stir up racial or religious hatred, the court should assess the nature and intended effect of the publication, deterrence, its audience and any proved consequences. Comparable sentencing decisions may assist, but they are not guidelines and each case turns on its own factual matrix. A sentence may be manifestly excessive where it is out of line with those comparators after proper allowance for the offender’s circumstances. A guilty plea at the first opportunity attracts maximum credit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to six offences under section 19(1) and seven offences under section 29C(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. The offences arose from threatening and abusive Twitter posts directed at black, Muslim and Jewish people. The counts were specimen charges representing a larger volume of relevant Twitter activity.

At the Crown Court at Minshull Street, Manchester, the Recorder imposed concurrent sentences of four years’ imprisonment. The appellant appealed, contending principally that the sentence was manifestly excessive when compared with sentences for similar offending. The central issue was the appropriate sentence after allowing for the seriousness and dissemination of the posts, personal mitigation and the guilty pleas.

1. Appeal allowed. The concurrent four-year sentences were manifestly excessive. The court quashed them and substituted concurrent sentences of two years and eight months’ imprisonment on each count.
2. For offences under sections 19(1) and 29C(1) of the Public Order Act 1986, relevant sentencing considerations include the nature of the publication and the intention behind it, deterrence, the number of persons who saw it, and the consequences of its dissemination. The tweets were grossly offensive, deliberately hateful and damaging to society. Deterrence was plainly important. Their potential for further dissemination was substantial, although the actual audience was uncertain and there was no evidence of particular consequences.
3. The court treated the comparative authorities as helpful but not as guidelines. Each case required assessment on its own facts. The sentence selected after trial was nevertheless out of line with the assistance provided by R v Sheppard & Whittle [2010] EWCA Crim 65, R v Bonehill-Paine [2016] EWCA Crim 980, and R v Burns [2017] EWCA Crim 1466.
4. The Recorder was entitled to consider the specimen counts in the context of the wider Twitter activity. The delay before proceedings warranted no significant reduction, and the appellant’s lack of representation at sentence resulted from his own choice. However, he had no previous convictions of a like nature, was an unsophisticated social-media offender, and his existing record concerned different offending. A sentence of four years after trial was appropriate. Maximum credit for the first-opportunity guilty pleas reduced that term to two years and eight months.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the sentence appeal in [2019] EWCA Crim 1372, quashed the concurrent four-year terms and substituted concurrent terms of two years and eight months.
• Crown Court at Minshull Street, Manchester: On 15 February 2018, imposed concurrent sentences of four years’ imprisonment for the 13 offences.
• Magistrates’ court: The appellant pleaded guilty on 18 January 2018 and was committed to the Crown Court for sentence under section 3 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.