Awan, R v

A restraining order under Protection from Harassment Act 1997 must be necessary to protect the victim and proportionate to the harm to be prevented. The court must obtain and consider the protected person’s views. Where children are affected, it must ensure that the order does not make otherwise appropriate parent-child contact impossible in practice.

An indefinite prohibition requires a proper justification. A condition permitting contact only through solicitors may be disproportionate where neither parent has a solicitor. The order may instead use workable, specified intermediaries and tailored geographical restrictions.

The appellant pleaded guilty in a magistrates’ court to harassment contrary to section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. As the offence was committed during a Crown Court suspended sentence, he was committed to the Crown Court at Bradford for sentence.

On 23 May 2019, the Crown Court imposed two months’ imprisonment and activated a reduced six-month suspended sentence consecutively. It also made an indefinite restraining order prohibiting contact with the complainant and her sister. Contact concerning the appellant’s children was permitted only through solicitors.

The appellant appealed only against that order. The central issue was whether its indefinite duration and solicitor-only child-contact proviso were necessary and proportionate.

1. The appeal was allowed. The Court quashed the restraining order and substituted a five-year order.

2. Section 5(2) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 permits prohibitions designed to protect a victim or another named person from further harassment or conduct causing fear of violence. On the facts, it was appropriate to prohibit contact with the complainant and her sister.

3. The Court followed the principles in Khellaf [2017] 1 Cr.App.R (S) 1. The sentencing court should obtain the views of the person to be protected, make an order only where necessary, tailor its terms proportionately, and take particular care not to make suitable parent-child contact impossible.

4. The prosecution had not made proper enquiries of the complainant before the hearing. The indefinite duration had not been properly considered. There was no basis for preventing harassment indefinitely when it was realistic that the adult relationship would settle within a comparatively short period.

5. The solicitor-only proviso was impracticable because neither parent had a solicitor. It therefore impeded child contact more than was justified. The substituted order prohibited direct or indirect contact with the complainant, save through two named intermediaries to arrange child contact; prohibited contact with her sister; and barred the appellant from approaching within 100 metres of the specified home address.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Allowed the appeal against the restraining order, quashed it and substituted a five-year order: [2019] EWCA Crim 1456.

• Crown Court at Bradford — On 23 May 2019, sentenced the appellant for harassment, activated part of a suspended sentence consecutively, and imposed the restraining order challenged on appeal.

• Magistrates’ court — The appellant pleaded guilty to harassment contrary to section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and was committed to the Crown Court for sentence.