McNeill, R. v

In a sentence appeal, a reduction for an offender’s advanced age is a discretionary and ordinarily limited act of mercy, not an entitlement. Ill-health will rarely carry significant mitigating weight where it can be managed in custody. A sentencing judge’s assessment of remorse, formed after observing the offender through a trial, will not readily be displaced on appeal. Previous good character may carry little weight where the offender persists in serious offending after warnings and a conviction. A sentence within the applicable guideline category will not be varied unless it is manifestly excessive.

The appellant was convicted at Southwark Crown Court of four offences of stalking involving serious alarm or distress, contrary to section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1977, and six breaches of a restraining order, contrary to section 5(5) of that Act.

The offences formed part of a prolonged online campaign which propagated false allegations and exposed the personal details of families associated with a children’s school. The sentencing judge placed every offence in Category 1A of the applicable guideline and imposed a total sentence of nine years’ imprisonment.

The appellant challenged only the sentences for stalking. She relied on her age, ill-health, previous good character and asserted remorse. The central issue was whether those matters rendered the total sentence manifestly excessive.

1. The court dismissed the appeal. The appellant did not challenge the judge’s conclusion that every offence fell within Category 1A, the most serious category under the relevant sentencing guideline. Nor did she challenge the sentences for breach of the restraining order.

2. Following R v Millberry [2002] EWCA Crim 2891, an allowance for advanced age is discretionary mercy, not a right. It is ordinarily limited. The appellant was 74 when sentenced, and the court held that her age had minimal weight in light of the nine-year sentence and the seriousness of the offending. The judge had in any event made a generous allowance for age by reducing the total sentence otherwise attributable to the restraining-order breaches.

3. Ill-health may be material in an extreme case, such as terminal illness with a very short life expectancy. It will seldom amount to significant mitigation where the offender’s conditions can be managed in prison. There was no suggestion that the appellant’s conditions could not be managed in custody.

4. The appellant’s earlier good character had substantially diminished significance. After her 2016 conviction for breach of the restraining order, she continued the offending for which she was sentenced.

5. The sentencing judge’s finding that the appellant lacked remorse was not open to appellate second-guessing. Her failure to oppose a Criminal Behaviour Order, and her eventual instructions to remove online material after conviction, did not demonstrate meaningful remorse and carried very little mitigating weight.

6. The campaign was prolonged, planned and highly harmful. It involved repeated breaches of court orders and inflicted grave distress and disruption on several families. The total sentence was, if anything, lenient and was plainly not manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court dismissed the appellant’s appeal against sentence in [2019] EWCA Crim 1566.
• Southwark Crown Court: Following a jury trial before Her Honour Judge Cahill QC, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to a total of nine years’ imprisonment. No citation for that decision is stated in the judgment.