Jenkins, R v

[2019] EWCA Crim 1576

Case details

Case citations
[2019] EWCA Crim 1576
Court
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Judgment date
13 September 2019
Judgment text

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Subjects
Criminal Sentencing Sexual offences
Keywords
appeal against sentence grooming online sexual offending child sexual activity indecent photographs of a child Category 1A personal mitigation family hardship guilty plea credit manifestly excessive sentence
Outcome
appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

“Grooming” is not a term of art and may encompass a wide range of conduct. A sentencing judge may find grooming where an adult gradually gains a child’s trust through online communications, escalates sexual activity and normalises harmful behaviour.

Where the offending falls within the applicable highest sentencing category, the selection of a starting point within its range is a discretionary evaluative judgment. Personal mitigation carries limited weight in serious sexual offending. Foreseeable hardship to dependent family members does not make an immediate custodial sentence disproportionate.

Factual background

R v Jenkins concerned an appeal against sentence following guilty pleas at the Crown Court at Oxford to causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, including activity with penetration, and making indecent photographs of a child.

The appellant, aged 55 at the time of the offending, developed an online relationship with a 15-year-old girl. The sentencing judge found that he had groomed her and placed the principal offence in Category 1A of the relevant definitive guideline. A total sentence of four years’ imprisonment was imposed after full credit for the guilty plea.

The appeal challenged the six-year pre-plea starting point and the weight given to the appellant’s personal mitigation, including his role as carer for his disabled wife.

Held

  1. Appeal dismissed. The total sentence of four years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

  2. The court rejected the submission that grooming required a narrowly defined process of eroding a victim’s existing social or moral barriers. As stated in Porter, [2017] EWCA Crim 1454, grooming is not a term of art and may cover a wide range of behaviour. The sentencing judge was entitled to find classic grooming in the appellant’s progressive online conduct: he gained the child’s trust, drew her into sexual activity and escalated the communications until she produced the sexual video.

  3. In any event, the principal offence fell squarely within Category 1A because of the sexual images solicited and the age disparity. Although the category starting point was five years, the judge was entitled, having assessed all the circumstances and the victim personal statement, to select a pre-plea starting point of six years within the available range. Reducing that sentence to four years for the guilty plea was within the judge’s discretion.

  4. Personal mitigation carried limited weight in this type of offending. The severe effect of imprisonment on the appellant’s disabled wife and family was foreseeable when he committed the offences. Immediate custody was inevitable; the relevant question was the period for which his family would be without his care. The concurrent sentences and Sexual Harm Prevention Order were undisturbed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against sentence: [2019] EWCA Crim 1576.

  • Crown Court at Oxford: on 22 March 2019, following guilty pleas, imposed a total sentence of four years’ imprisonment and made a Sexual Harm Prevention Order.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal dismissed

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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