Szewczyk, R. v

For an offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the actus reus is objectively established when a person has a bladed or pointed article with them in a public place. The Crown need not prove an offensive intention, or any other purpose for carrying it. Even very short possession is sufficient.

Once those elements are proved, the defendant bears the statutory burden of proving good reason or lawful authority. The different structure and purpose of section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, which may require proof that a non-inherently offensive article became an offensive weapon through intention, does not qualify section 139.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Reading of two offences of having an article with a blade or point contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. He received concurrent sentences of 12 months’ imprisonment, with a previously suspended 12-month sentence activated consecutively.

He said that, after being attacked, he had disarmed another man of two kitchen knives and intended to dispose of them safely. The prosecution case was that he remained in possession of the knives after that incident. On an appeal against conviction, the central issue was whether the Crown had to prove a prior period of carrying with a particular intent, or whether the appellant had to establish good reason or lawful authority once possession was shown.

1. Appeal dismissed. Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 has a straightforward and objective operation. A person commits its actus reus by having an article falling within the statutory description with them in a public place. The provision does not require the article to be offensive per se, nor proof that it was carried with an offensive or other particular intention.

2. The court rejected the proposed analogy with section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. In Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 1 WLR 724, following the construction adopted in R v Jura (1954) 38 Cr App R 53, an article not offensive by nature only became an offensive weapon when the requisite intention was formed. That feature arose from the statutory definition and purpose of the 1953 Act. It avoided treating an instantaneous seizure and use of an otherwise innocent article as the separate offence of carrying an offensive weapon.

3. That reasoning did not transfer through the shared words “has with him”. Under section 139, the prohibited character of a bladed article is defined objectively. Once the Crown proves possession in public, the defendant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, good reason or lawful authority under section 139(4).

4. Very short possession can satisfy section 139. On the evidence, the appellant’s possession after disarming the other man was not instantaneous: he retained the knives while speaking with him for 10 to 15 minutes. The statutory defence was therefore engaged, and the conviction stood. The court also observed, without deciding, that the application of the 1953 Act to a weapon offensive per se remained open for appellate determination.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — by [2019] EWCA Crim 1811, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Reading — convicted the appellant of two offences contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and imposed concurrent 12-month sentences.