Naseem (Jnr) & Ors, R. v

Offences of arranging or facilitating travel for exploitation under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 are inherently serious. Sentencing must reflect sustained, organised and profit-driven exploitation of vulnerable people, including the use of victims as very cheap labour and in benefit fraud. Good character, personal mitigation and delay may reduce sentence, but do not ordinarily displace immediate custody where the offending continued for years and was motivated by greed.

On appeal, the statutory maximum remains material to proportionality: it must leave room for more serious offending. Proper credit must also be given for relevant foreign detention and restrictive non-qualifying curfew.

Three defendants were convicted after a trial of offences arising from the trafficking and exploitation of vulnerable Slovakian nationals between 2007 and 2013. Aurangzeb Mohammed Naseem and Mohammed Naseem were each convicted of three offences contrary to section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. Frantisek Cisar was convicted of six such offences and conspiracy to arrange or facilitate travel to the United Kingdom for exploitation.

On 4 October 2018, the trial judge imposed total sentences of three years and six months’ imprisonment, 18 months’ imprisonment, and nine years’ imprisonment respectively. Aurangzeb Naseem and Cisar appealed against sentence with leave. Mohammed Naseem renewed his application after the single judge refused leave. The central issue was whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.

1. The court dismissed Aurangzeb Naseem’s appeal, refused Mohammed Naseem’s renewed application for leave to appeal, and allowed Cisar’s appeal to the limited extent of reducing his total sentence from nine years to six years and six months.

2. There was no definitive guideline for offences contrary to section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, but those offences were inherently serious. The statutory maximum of 14 years and the nature of the offending justified a serious sentencing approach. The arrangements were for the offenders’ financial advantage, not for the victims’ benefit.

3. The aggravating features included exploitation of multiple vulnerable victims for profit, offending over years, planning and organisation, minimal pay, false debt claims, and benefit fraud from which Cisar’s family profited. Sharing fraudulent benefits with victims aggravated rather than mitigated the offending. Although the victims were not subjected to violence or forcible confinement, their vulnerability, lack of money, limited English and control through debt, bank accounts, correspondence and transport substantially constrained them.

4. Positive character, personal mitigation and delay were properly limited in weight. The appellants had denied guilt throughout and were convicted after trial. The seriousness and need for deterrence meant that immediate custody was unavoidable for both Naseems. Their respective sentences were not manifestly excessive, and the disparity complaint concerning Mohammed Naseem had no merit because the comparator’s suspended sentence rested solely on health grounds.

5. Cisar’s leading role and greater culpability warranted a substantially longer sentence. However, nine years was outside the proper range because the statutory maximum had to accommodate more serious and repeat offending. Allowing more fully for his detention abroad and restrictive non-qualifying curfew, the court quashed the nine-year sentence on the conspiracy count and substituted six years and six months. His concurrent sentences on the remaining counts were unchanged.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2019] EWCA Crim 2279, Aurangzeb Naseem’s appeal against sentence was dismissed, Mohammed Naseem’s renewed application for leave was refused, and Cisar’s appeal was allowed only to reduce his total sentence.
• Trial court: Following convictions at trial in July 2018, sentences were imposed on 4 October 2018. The earlier trial had ended when the jury was discharged in October 2017. No citation for the trial-court decision was stated in the judgment.