Daniels, R. v

For sentencing, reaching 18 does not create a cliff edge. A young adult’s actual maturity, vulnerability and developmental circumstances may reduce culpability where reliable evidence supports that conclusion. The youth sentencing guideline does not apply directly to adults, but its relevant considerations may inform sentence.

The prevalence or public concern associated with fatal dangerous driving, including joy riding, does not justify departing from ordinary sentencing principle. On an Attorney General’s reference, the court assesses the sentence overall. A sentence is unduly lenient only if it falls outside the proper range by a margin.

The offender pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving and two offences of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988. While driving a stolen car at very high speed during a police pursuit, he collided with another vehicle. One occupant was killed and two people were seriously injured.

The sentencing judge treated the offending as level 1 under the applicable guideline. Starting from 12 years’ detention for a mature adult, the judge reduced the starting point to reflect the offender’s youth, immaturity and vulnerability, then gave full credit for the guilty pleas. The resulting sentence was six years and six months’ detention.

The Solicitor General sought leave, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. The issues were whether the reductions for the offender’s characteristics and plea were excessive, and whether public concern about joy riding required a different approach.

1. The court refused leave to refer the sentence. The correct question on an unduly lenient sentence reference is not whether each part of the sentencing judge’s reasoning can be criticised. The court must decide whether the sentence, considered in the round, fell outside the range properly open to the judge by a margin.

2. The 12-year starting point, before credit for plea, was proper for this level 1 dangerous-driving offence. It reflected the extreme harm, the aggravating features and the statutory maximum. The concurrent sentences for serious-injury offences were also correctly reflected through an increase in the sentence for the offence causing death.

3. The judge was entitled to reduce the starting point for the offender’s youth, immaturity and vulnerability. As explained in R v Clarke and Others [2018] EWCA Crim 185, adulthood at 18 is not a sentencing cliff edge. Although the guideline for children and young people did not directly govern this adult offender, its relevant considerations could inform the assessment of culpability. The psychological and pre-sentence evidence supported the judge’s conclusion that the offender was substantially immature and vulnerable.

4. Public concern about fatal dangerous or careless driving, including joy riding by young men, does not displace the ordinary duty to take proper account of youth, maturity and vulnerability.

5. The judge had been generous in allowing full credit for the guilty pleas. Ordinarily, the applicable plea guideline indicated a 25 per cent reduction at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and the circumstances did not justify waiting for a psychological report before accepting responsibility. Nevertheless, the starting point could itself have been lower. Taking account of genuine remorse, youth, vulnerability, immaturity and the pleas, the final sentence could not be stigmatised as unduly lenient.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). On the Solicitor General’s application under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court refused leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient: [2019] EWCA Crim 296.
• Sentencing court. The offender was sentenced to six years and six months’ detention in a young offender institution for causing death by dangerous driving, with concurrent four-year terms for the serious-injury offences. The court and citation are not stated in the judgment.