Beale, R v

Guidance on rape myths and stereotypes is ordinarily directed to the fair assessment of a complainant’s evidence. It is guidance rather than a direction of law. Although a defendant may exceptionally require comparable guidance, its necessity depends on the evidence and the trial as a whole.

The absence of such guidance does not render a trial unfair where the prosecution relies on objective evidence of fabrication rather than stereotyped assumptions. A complaint about publicity also requires an evidential basis that jurors encountered prejudicial material or that the trial was affected. Sentencing for perjury and perverting the course of justice may properly exceed earlier comparators where the offending is exceptionally aggravated, despite substantial personal mitigation.

The appellant was convicted at Southwark Crown Court of three counts of perjury and four counts of perverting the course of justice. The offences arose from repeated false allegations of rape and serious sexual violence, including allegations that led to the conviction and imprisonment of one man, and the arrest or bail of others. She received a total sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.

She renewed an application for leave to appeal against conviction. She argued that the jury should have received guidance on rape myths and stereotypes, and that media reporting after the loss of her anonymity had made the trial unfair. She also appealed her sentence as manifestly excessive, relying on her childhood rape, psychiatric difficulties, youth and totality.

1. The court allowed the procedural application to vary the grounds, but refused leave to appeal against conviction and dismissed the appeal against sentence.

2. The court accepted that myths and stereotypes concerning rape complainants persist. A trial judge should therefore give suitable, balanced guidance where it is needed for a fair assessment of a complainant’s evidence. That guidance is not a direction of law and is ordinarily directed to complainants, who do not have a defendant’s protections of the burden and standard of proof. The court accepted that an appropriate case might arise in which such guidance could assist a defendant. This was not such a case.

3. The prosecution had not relied on generalised assumptions about how a genuine rape complainant would behave. It relied on independent and objective evidence, including CCTV, medical and telephone evidence, prior admissions, and a sustained pattern of false allegations. The defence had placed the appellant’s vulnerability, childhood rape and psychiatric condition before the jury. Any further guidance would not have assisted her.

4. The anonymity issue disclosed no unfairness. Under Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, section 1 was qualified so that the appellant’s identity could be published in proceedings in which she was accused of perjury. The reporting restriction power in Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 4(2), required a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in the trial itself. There was no evidence that a juror had seen publicity, disobeyed directions, or been influenced by it.

5. The sentencing judge was entitled to regard the case as exceptional. The appellant’s lies caused an innocent man to stand trial twice and serve imprisonment, were reinforced by perjury and a victim personal statement, and were motivated in part by financial gain. Later allegations exposed further men to arrest, charge or prolonged bail. Her childhood rape, mental-health difficulties and youth were substantial mitigation, but did not make the total sentence of ten years manifestly excessive. A sentence above the ranges discussed in R v Vine [2011] EWCA Crim 1860 and R v Costin [2018] EWCA Crim 138 was justified.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court refused renewed leave to appeal against conviction and dismissed the appeal against the ten-year sentence: [2019] EWCA Crim 665.
• Southwark Crown Court: The appellant was convicted of three counts of perjury and four counts of perverting the course of justice, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.