Perrett, R v

An adult woman’s sexual touching of a boy under 16, including placing his penis inside her vagina, may constitute indecent assault under section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. A statutory time bar applicable to unlawful intercourse with a girl under section 6 does not prevent a prosecution under section 15 where there was no equivalent statutory offence concerning a boy.

Historic sexual offending should be sentenced by applying current guidance flexibly and with common sense. The court should identify the modern equivalent offence, assess harm and culpability, and retain proper regard to the historic maximum sentence. The approach is unaffected by the offender’s sex.

The applicant was convicted at Ipswich Crown Court of six counts of indecent assault on a boy under 16, contrary to section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, for conduct in the 1980s. The complainant was 14 at the relevant time. The applicant received a total sentence of four years and nine months’ imprisonment.

After the single judge refused permission, she renewed applications to appeal against conviction and sentence. Her conviction grounds challenged the complainant’s capacity, the use of section 15 instead of an unlawful-intercourse charge, and whether sexual intercourse by an adult woman with a boy could amount to indecent assault. Her sentence grounds challenged the absence of reports, aggravating factors, and the application of current sentencing guidelines to historic offences.

1. The court refused both renewed applications for permission to appeal. The convictions were safe and the total sentence of four years and nine months was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

2. The sentencing judge’s reference to the complainant as aged “13, 14” was a slip made when describing the earlier abuse by another offender. At trial all parties proceeded on the basis that he was at least 14, and the chronology placed the first relevant event when he was about 14 and a half. Capacity was therefore not an issue.

3. R v J [2005] 1 AC 562 concerned the statutory bar on using section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 to prosecute, after the section 6 time limit, conduct consisting only of unlawful intercourse with a girl under 16. That reasoning did not apply. There was no equivalent section 6 offence for intercourse with a boy and no statutory time bar which the prosecution had sought to evade.

4. The court followed Faulkner v Talbot [1982] 74 Crim. App R(S) 1. Deliberate sexual touching by an adult woman of a boy under 16 is capable of being an indecent assault under section 15, including when it forms part of sexual intercourse. The boy’s actual willingness could not supply legal consent. The provision was not discriminatory; it applied to predatory sexual offending regardless of the offender’s sex.

5. The sentencing judge was entitled to proceed without a pre-sentence or psychiatric report, since immediate custody was inevitable and the evidence already heard was sufficient. A false and gratuitous allegation of attempted rape against the complainant, rejected by the jury, could properly be treated as a modest aggravating feature.

6. Applying R v Forbes [2016] 2 Crim. App R(S) 44, the judge properly used current guidance flexibly. He identified section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 as the modern equivalent, while retaining the historic maximum of 10 years. The principal offence was properly categorised as category 1A because of penetrative sexual conduct, the substantial age disparity, grooming and planning. A five-year starting point, adjusted to five and a half years for aggravation and reduced for good character, produced an appropriate sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): renewed applications for permission to appeal against conviction and sentence refused: [2019] EWCA Crim 685.
• Single judge of the Court of Appeal: initially refused permission to appeal; the applicant renewed the applications before the full court.
• Crown Court at Ipswich: on 31 January 2018, convicted the applicant of six counts under section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956; on 27 February 2018, imposed a total sentence of four years and nine months’ imprisonment.