RR, R. v

An intention to bring a criminal prosecution to an end does not, without more, establish an intention to pervert the course of justice. Where a defendant seeks to persuade a complainant or witness to withdraw evidence, the jury must decide whether the means used were unlawful or improper. That assessment depends on all the circumstances. A payment may support conviction only if the jury are sure it was intended as a bribe or improper inducement. A direction which equates an intention to end the prosecution with an intention to pervert justice is inadequate and may render a conviction unsafe.

The appellant was tried at Manchester Minshull Street Crown Court on two counts of rape and one count of perverting the course of justice. The jury acquitted him of rape but convicted him, by a majority, of perverting the course of justice after he contacted the complainant's relatives and friends while on bail and sent her £690.

The trial judge directed the jury that the relevant questions were whether the communications tended, and were intended, to bring the rape prosecution to an end. When the jury asked whether they could convict on count 3 despite acquittal on the rape counts, the judge answered yes without further explanation.

The appeal concerned whether the jury should have been directed to assess the propriety of the means used to seek withdrawal of the allegations.

1. The court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and quashed the conviction for perverting the course of justice as unsafe.

2. Applying R v Kellett [1976] QB 372, the court held that an attempt to persuade a witness or complainant to withdraw evidence is not necessarily criminal merely because the defendant wishes the proceedings to end. Where the defendant genuinely believes the underlying allegation to be false, guilt depends on whether the means used to achieve that end were unlawful or improper. Impropriety is a question for the jury on all the circumstances.

3. The trial direction wrongly treated a tendency or intention to end the rape prosecution as sufficient in itself. The jury should have been told that, although acquittal of the rape counts did not preclude conviction on count 3, they could convict only if sure that the appellant used improper means to obtain withdrawal of the complaint. In particular, the £690 could support conviction only if intended as a bribe or improper inducement. The communications and payment were not manifestly improper, and the court could not conclude that a properly directed jury would necessarily have convicted.

4. The Crown did not seek a retrial. The costs order, being part of the sentence for the quashed conviction, was also quashed. Under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 5A(3), the case was remitted to the Crown Court to consider afresh whether a protective restraining order should be made following the acquittal. The court did not direct that the original trial judge determine that issue.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): granted an extension of time and leave, allowed the conviction appeal, quashed the conviction, and remitted the restraining-order issue under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 5A(3): [2019] EWCA Crim 866.
• Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street: the appellant was acquitted of two rape counts but convicted of perverting the course of justice on 22 November 2017. On 20 December 2017 he received eight months' imprisonment, a restraining order and a costs order.