Hewson v Times Newspapers Ltd & Anor

In a defamation claim where meaning is tried as a preliminary issue, the claimant may apply to amend a pleaded meaning, including by raising a more serious Chase-level meaning. The pleaded meaning remains a significant case-management reference point, but it does not prevent an amendment application.

The court must apply the overriding objective and assess whether the proposed amendment has a real prospect of success. Lateness increases the risk of disruption and may impose a heavy burden on the applicant. Permission should nevertheless be granted where the amendment enables the real dispute to be determined and the prejudice to the defendants is limited, particularly where no trial date is lost and the evidence and existing submissions remain substantially usable.

The claimant brought libel proceedings against the publishers of The Times and MailOnline concerning articles published on 12 April 2017. The parties had agreed that meaning would be tried as a preliminary issue without an oral hearing.

The claimant initially pleaded a meaning that the articles conveyed that it was highly likely or reasonably suspected that she had committed specified criminal acts. Shortly before the paper determination, she sought permission to amend by adding that she had committed the acts, or was almost certainly guilty of them, thereby introducing a Chase-level 1 meaning. The defendants opposed the amendment on grounds of lateness, prejudice and lack of a real prospect of success.

1. Amendment allowed. The claimant was permitted to amend her Particulars of Claim to advance the revised meaning.
2. Applications to amend are governed by the overriding objective in the Civil Procedure Rules. The court must deal with the case justly and at proportionate cost, act expeditiously and allocate no more than a fair share of limited court resources. The applicant must also show that the amendment has a real prospect of success.
3. The later an amendment is sought, the greater the risk that disruption to the litigation, especially a trial, will justify refusal. Authorities concerning late amendments impose a heavy onus where a new and significantly different case would substantially disrupt proceedings. The relevant considerations include the terms of the amendment, the history and timing of the application, the explanation for delay, and prejudice to each party.
4. The rule in Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] QB 157 prevents a claimant from inviting the court to find a meaning higher than the pleaded meaning, but it does not prevent an application to amend. The rule therefore had no independent bearing on whether permission should be granted.
5. The proposed level 1 meaning was not fanciful and therefore had a real prospect of success. The court would assess the articles as a whole and in context when determining meaning. The possible effect of the repetition rule, considered in Brown v Bower [2017] 4 WLR 197, did not justify refusing permission at this stage.
6. The amendment caused limited prejudice. It would cause some delay, but no trial date was lost, no new evidence or disclosure was required, and the parties had already advanced their respective cases on meaning. Refusal would risk preventing the real dispute from being adjudicated and causing greater prejudice to the claimant.