Frost v Her Majesty's Coroner for West Yorkshire (Eastern District)

Under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988, fresh facts or evidence which may show that the substantial truth about a death was not revealed at the original inquest can justify a fresh inquest in the interests of justice. The applicant need not show that a different conclusion is likely. The court must sensibly evaluate the likely nature and range of the new evidence, while applying a discretionary and disjunctive necessity-or-desirability test. Delay and the death of persons implicated do not necessarily defeat an application where the public interest and the interests of bereaved families remain substantial. A fresh inquest may investigate facts bearing on criminal liability, but its determination cannot be framed as finding a named person criminally liable.

Elsie Frost was murdered in 1965. A 1966 inquest recorded that Ian Bernard Spencer had murdered her, but criminal proceedings ended when the Crown offered no evidence and a not guilty verdict was directed. A later police investigation focused on Peter Pickering and resulted in a file being sent to the CPS, although Pickering died before any charging decision.

Colin Frost applied, with the Attorney-General's fiat, under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988 to quash the original inquisition and require a fresh inquest. The central issues were whether the later investigation disclosed new facts or evidence, whether a fresh inquest was necessary or desirable in the interests of justice, and whether the lapse of 53 years or the deaths of Spencer and Pickering made such an order futile.

1. Statutory test. Section 13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988 creates a two-stage inquiry. The discovery of new facts or evidence is the gateway. The court must then decide whether another investigation is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice. Necessity and desirability are disjunctive. Even where the statutory preconditions are met, the relief remains discretionary, with the overall interests of justice paramount.
2. New evidence and the likelihood of a different verdict. Applying the guidance in HM Attorney General v HM Coroner for South Yorkshire (West) [2012] EWHC 3783 (Admin), the scope and nature of the police investigation, and the submission of the file to the CPS, supported the inference that fresh evidence might reveal that the substantial truth had not emerged at the first inquest. The applicant did not have to establish that a different verdict was likely. It was sufficient to show new facts or evidence making a fresh inquest necessary or desirable.
3. Delay and the interests of justice. The 53-year lapse did not significantly diminish the public interest. The continuing importance of the matter to both families was a relevant and powerful consideration. The deaths of Spencer and Pickering did not make a fresh inquest futile, unnecessary or undesirable. A fresh inquest could provide public examination of the available evidence and some resolution, even though it could not determine criminal liability against a named person.
4. Limits on an inquest's determination. The authorities, including R v HM Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe, ex parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1 and Coroner for the Birmingham Inquests (1974) v Hambleton [2018] EWCA Civ 2018, establish that an inquest may investigate facts bearing on criminal liability, but its verdict or determination cannot appear to find a named person guilty. This limitation did not prevent investigation of the new facts or correction of the former record.
5. Disposition. It was insufficient merely to delete Spencer's name from the original record. The court quashed the inquisition dated 11 January 1966 and ordered that a fresh inquest be held.