Adamson, R (On the Application Of) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council

[2019] EWHC 1129 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2019] EWHC 1129 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
9 May 2019
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Public law Statutory appropriation of land
Keywords
statutory appropriation allotments ministerial consent judicial review section 31(2A) undue delay notice to quit planning scheme
Outcome
claim succeeded
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Statutory appropriation of land does not require a prescribed formal procedure. It requires a conscious and deliberative decision by the local authority to devote identified land to a statutory purpose. Whether that occurred is fact sensitive. A recorded planning or committee decision zoning specific land for allotments may constitute appropriation, particularly where made in the exercise of statutory functions. Mere use or management of land is insufficient.

Where land has been appropriated for allotments, disposal for another purpose requires ministerial consent under the Allotments Act 1925. The court must refuse judicial review relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 only where it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different. Relief was not barred by delay where the claim was brought promptly after the challenged decision.

Factual background

The claimant and 13 other allotment holders occupied land at Cemetery Road, Huddersfield. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council resolved to appropriate the site for a new primary school and served notices to quit. The council considered that the land had never been statutorily appropriated for allotments and that ministerial consent was unnecessary.

The claimant relied on historic committee minutes, particularly a 1935 decision to zone the land for allotments. He sought judicial review of the appropriation decision and his notice to quit. The council argued that the historical material showed only informal use, and that relief should in any event be refused under sections 31(2A) and 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The central issues were whether the land had been appropriated for allotments and whether relief should be withheld.

Held

  1. Appropriation. The statutory context showed that the corporation had power to appropriate land for allotments. There is no required formal procedure. The question is whether the authority made a conscious and deliberative decision to devote identified land to the relevant statutory purpose.
  2. The 1935 committee decision was not merely a record of informal use or a request to correct maps. In the context of the town-planning scheme, the decision to zone the Cemetery Road land for allotments was a formal decision made in the performance of statutory functions. It therefore constituted statutory appropriation. The subsequent use of the land as allotments supported that conclusion. The later discussions in the 1950s did not negate the earlier appropriation.
  3. The court applied the approach in R (Goodman) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, namely that appropriation cannot be inferred merely from the manner in which land is managed, but that no particular form of decision is required. Depending on the facts, a formal allotment lease or the formal taking of control by an allotments committee may also evidence appropriation.
  4. Because the land had been appropriated for allotments, the council could not lawfully appropriate it for educational use without the ministerial consent required by section 8 of the Allotments Act 1925. The decision to appropriate the site for the school was therefore unlawful.
  5. Under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court had to undertake its own objective assessment of the counterfactual decision-making process. The relevant conduct included the unlawful appropriation decision and the notice to quit, not merely the omission to seek ministerial consent. It was not highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially the same: consent might have been granted, possibly with conditions, but alternative planning arrangements remained possible.
  6. The claim was brought within a reasonable period after the challenged decision. The delay was not undue and had not caused the asserted prejudice. The appropriation decision and the notice to quit were quashed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

First-instance judicial review proceedings. No prior decision in the same proceedings is stated in the judgment.

Appeal to higher court

Outcome of appeal
appeal allowed

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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