Gilchrist v Greater Manchester Police (Rev 1)

Police use of force must be justified at three levels: the decision to use force, the type of force selected, and its extent. Reasonableness is assessed in all the circumstances, including the speed and stress of events, the information reasonably available to officers, the perceived threat, the subject’s vulnerability and relevant operational policy. Once officers know that a person is vulnerable, and weapons have proved ineffective or are contraindicated, continued use of those weapons may be unjustified where officers can safely use physical restraint. The police may owe an ordinary negligence duty for physical injury caused by their positive acts. The seriousness of injury does not determine whether the force was reasonable.

The claimant, a vulnerable adult with learning difficulties, autistic spectrum disorder and bipolar disorder, suffered serious psychological injury after Greater Manchester Police used CS spray, Taser and physical restraint during an episode of acute behavioural disorder. He brought claims in battery and negligence. Permission to proceed was granted under section 139(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983, and the matter was tried preliminarily on all liability issues.

The central questions were whether any force was justified, whether the methods selected were justified, and whether the level and duration of force were reasonable in all the circumstances.

1. The claim succeeded in part. The court held that the initial uses of CS spray and Taser, and the physical force used to bring the claimant to the ground, were justified. The claimant was also lawfully restrained on his back in the front-stack handcuffing position pending ambulance transport.

2. Under section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, force used to prevent crime or effect an arrest must be reasonable in the circumstances. Applying McCarthy v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2016] EWCA Civ 1257, the court assessed separately the justification for using force, the method used and its extent. The assessment must allow for rapidly developing and stressful operational conditions, without imposing an unrealistically demanding standard of hindsight.

3. The officers initially had reasonable grounds to believe that the claimant was a potentially dangerous aggressor who might have injured another person. On that information, the first two uses of CS spray and PC Farrell’s Taser discharge were reasonable and lawful. The fact that the claimant’s injuries were serious did not itself make the force unreasonable, applying McDonnell v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2015] EWCA Civ 573.

4. By approximately 6.03–6.04 am, the officers knew that the claimant was vulnerable and had seen that CS spray and Taser had little or no effect. He was moving slowly, no immediate attack appeared likely, CS spray had already been used, and sufficient officers were present to restrain him physically. The further Taser deployment, comprising eight cycles over 72 seconds, was contrary to policy and unjustified. The additional discharge while the claimant was on the ground was also unjustified and inflicted unnecessary pain.

5. The tackles and subsequent restraint were reasonable responses to the risk of escalation and the claimant’s continuing resistance. The alleged further use of CS spray while he was restrained was not proved.

6. For negligence, the police were subject to the ordinary duty of care recognised in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4. The unjustified Taser use amounted both to trespass to the person and to breach of that duty. Liability was established to that extent.

First-instance liability trial in the High Court. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.