Szlachetka v Circuit Court in Koszalin, Poland

On an extradition appeal, an error in assessing responsibility for delay does not itself justify allowing the appeal. Under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, the appeal succeeds only if the extradition judge ought to have decided a question differently and, on the correct decision, would have been required to discharge the requested person.

Unexplained prosecutorial delay weighs against extradition, particularly where personal relationships developed during the delay. However, the public interest in extradition remains weighty. A strong Article 8 case is required, and the gravity of the alleged offence, together with the nature of the requested person’s family and financial circumstances, may outweigh the delay and its consequences.

This was an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 from a decision of Deputy Senior District Judge Tan Ikram in the Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 21 December 2017.

The appellant had lived openly in Wales since 2014, after an earlier European Arrest Warrant had been dismissed on a technical defect. A further warrant was issued more than three years later in respect of the same alleged 2007 assault. During the intervening period, the appellant formed and developed a relationship with his partner.

The central issues were whether the unexplained delay affected the Article 8 balancing exercise and whether the district judge’s attribution of responsibility for the delay required the appellant’s discharge.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The district judge had erred in stating that the appellant had only himself to blame for the delay between 2014 and 2017. Responsibility for bringing extradition proceedings to a conclusion lay primarily with the prosecuting authorities, and the unexplained delay weighed materially against extradition.

2. That error did not satisfy the statutory test in section 27(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. The High Court could allow the appeal only if the district judge ought to have decided a question differently and, had he done so, would have been required to order the appellant’s discharge.

3. The delay formed part of the Article 8 balancing exercise. It was particularly significant because the appellant had formed and cemented his relationship during the unexplained period. The cases of Bicioc v Baia Mare Local Court, Romania [2017] EWHC 3391 (Admin) and Camaras v Baia Mare Local Court, Romania [2016] EWHC 1766 (Admin) were fact-specific examples in which delay between successive warrants had contributed to discharge. The present case differed because the earlier warrant had been dismissed on a technicality and the appellant knew that a further warrant remained possible.

4. Despite the delay and its impact on the appellant’s relationship, the public interest in extradition was weighty. The alleged attack was exceptionally serious and had caused grave and lasting physical and psychological injuries. The relationship was relatively recent, there were no children, and the partner was employed. Even on the corrected assessment of delay, the Article 8 factors did not require discharge.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 dismissed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: Deputy Senior District Judge Tan Ikram ordered extradition on 21 December 2017.