Bicioc v Baia Mare Local Court, Romania

In an extradition appeal based on article 8, proportionality must be assessed by identifying and weighing the factors for and against extradition. The strong public interest in honouring extradition obligations remains important, but the court must consider the individual circumstances of the requested person and family.

Material factors may include the seriousness of the offence, delay, the consequences of an earlier discharge of an arrest warrant, changes made in reliance on that discharge, family relationships, the effect on children, and restrictions imposed by bail. The appellate court focuses on whether the district judge’s proportionality decision was wrong. Errors in reasoning matter where they show that material factors were omitted or the balance was materially misstated.

The appellant had been convicted in Romania in his absence of driving with excess alcohol and sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment. An earlier extradition order was overturned because he had not deliberately absented himself from a properly commenced trial and Romanian law then provided no guaranteed right to a retrial.

After Romanian law changed, a further European arrest warrant was issued. District Judge Wright ordered extradition, accepting that it would interfere with the appellant’s family life but concluding that extradition was necessary and proportionate. The appeal to the Administrative Court concerned article 8, principally the seriousness of the offence, delay, the earlier discharge, the appellant’s family circumstances and time spent on conditional bail.

1. Appeal allowed. The district judge’s article 8 proportionality decision was wrong. The appellate question was whether the decision itself was wrong, while factual findings made after hearing evidence ordinarily required respect.
2. The judge was materially confused about the alcohol reading. The European arrest warrant recorded 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, whereas the district judge treated it as 130 micrograms per 100 millilitres of breath. Properly understood, the offence was neither trivial nor minor, but it could not properly be characterised as serious. English thresholds and sentencing practice were relevant only as context, and could not justify a re-sentencing exercise.
3. Following Camaras v Baia Mare Local Court, Romania [2016] EWHC 1766 (Admin), the consequences of the earlier discharge of the European arrest warrant were a distinct factor and could not be treated merely as delay. The appellant had reasonably continued to establish his family life in the United Kingdom, including having a second child before the new warrant was issued.
4. The district judge also failed to take into account the substantial period spent on conditional bail subject to a curfew. That restriction on liberty was a relevant factor against extradition.
5. The court placed substantial weight on the public interest in fulfilling international extradition obligations and avoiding the United Kingdom becoming a safe haven for fugitives. It also gave some weight to the appellant’s provision of a false address, although this had to be understood in the light of the earlier finding that the trial process had not properly commenced.
6. The factors against extradition included the children’s settled life and education in the United Kingdom, the likely disruption to their family life, the earlier discharge and subsequent family changes, the unexplained delay after the earlier appeal, the curfew, and the properly assessed seriousness of the offence. These factors outweighed those favouring extradition. The European arrest warrant was discharged.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Wright ordered extradition on 3 March 2016. The appeal was allowed and the European arrest warrant was discharged.
• High Court: An earlier extradition order by District Judge Coleman was overturned by Mitting J on 26 February 2014 because the appellant had not deliberately absented himself from a properly commenced trial and Romanian law did not then guarantee a retrial.