Prystaj & Anor v Circuit Court of Zielona Gora, Poland

Failure to obtain consent under the speciality procedure does not itself bar a later extradition where applicable speciality arrangements exist and no express statutory bar applies. The court should presume that a trusted extradition partner will act in good faith unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary.

An abuse of process requires a high threshold, including evidence that the extradition process has been usurped or manipulated. Passage of time bars extradition only where it makes a fair trial impossible or creates hardship amounting to oppression, assessed in the light of the seriousness of the alleged offence. Article 8 proportionality requires the competing private and public interests to be weighed, including culpable delay and interference with liberty.

The appellants appealed under sections 26 and 27 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Crane’s decision of 26 March 2018 ordering their extradition to Poland under European arrest warrants.

They were sought for prosecution for an alleged violent robbery committed in 2011. Each had previously been extradited to Poland on unrelated matters and had later returned to the United Kingdom. The appeals raised four issues: speciality under section 17; abuse of process; passage of time under section 14; and proportionality under section 21A and Article 8 ECHR.

1. Speciality. The failure of the Polish authorities to seek consent under Article 27(4) of the Framework Decision and sections 17 and 55 of the Extradition Act 2003 did not create a bar to extradition. Section 17 addresses whether speciality arrangements exist. Such arrangements existed with Poland. The statutory scheme did not contain an express bar for the procedural failure relied upon.
2. The principle of mutual trust required the court to accept the respondent judicial authority’s position that the warrants were validly issued, absent compelling evidence that Poland would act in breach of its speciality obligations. The appellants retained protection through the statutory extradition bars and remedies under Polish law.
3. Abuse of process. The threshold was high. There was no evidence that the respondent had usurped, manipulated or used the extradition process to oppress or unfairly prejudice the appellants. The evidence indicated failures of communication between Polish authorities, not bad faith or a knowing failure to follow the correct procedure. The ground therefore failed.
4. Passage of time. The appellants could rely on section 14 because they had not known of the present allegations and were not fugitives. Nevertheless, the delay had not made a fair trial impossible and the hardship caused by further extradition did not amount to oppression. The seriousness of the alleged violent robbery strengthened the public interest in extradition.
5. Article 8. The judge had considered the culpable delay, the failure to seek consent, the appellants’ circumstances and the electronically monitored curfew. Those matters did not outweigh the substantial public interest in extradition for a serious alleged offence. None of the grounds was made out. The appeals were dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeals against District Judge Crane’s orders of 26 March 2018 were dismissed. Permission to appeal had been granted on four grounds on 11 January 2019.