Damian Baciejowski v District Court in Koszalin, Poland

In assessing extradition after a lengthy lapse of time, all relevant periods must be considered where the requested person was not a fugitive. A prior extradition may constitute a missed opportunity, particularly where the requesting state could have pursued the outstanding offences through specialty procedures. That does not, by itself, make a later extradition oppressive or incompatible with Article 8. The court must assess the whole factual context, including the seriousness of the offences, the requested person’s awareness of the outstanding allegations, any false sense of security, culpable or unexplained delay, changes in circumstances, and the public interest in extradition. A second extradition after expiry of the specialty-related period is not inherently an abuse or oppressive.

The appellant challenged an order for his extradition to Poland to face trial for alleged bank-loan fraud and assault committed in 2011. The District Judge rejected objections based on statutory proportionality, section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, and Article 8 ECHR.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the passage of time was unjust or oppressive, relying on his earlier extradition from Germany to Poland in 2013 for unrelated offences. He contended that Poland had missed opportunities to prosecute the index offences during his imprisonment in Poland and had failed to seek Germany’s consent under the specialty provisions. He also relied on his settled life in the United Kingdom and alleged false security. The central issues were whether the District Judge had erred and, if so, whether extradition should be barred.

1. Section 21A proportionality. The District Judge correctly applied the statutory proportionality scheme and the principles in Miraszewski v Poland [2014] EWHC 4261 (Admin). Even if the assessment were retaken, extradition for the bank-loan fraud was proportionate because there were multiple exceptional circumstances, including the additional offence and the appellant’s significant offending history.
2. Fugitivity and passage of time. The appellant was not shown to have been a fugitive between December 2012 and July 2013, or between July 2013 and January 2016. A person surrendered to the requesting state and held in its custody is not a fugitive merely because specialty protection prevents prosecution for offences outside the extradition request. All the relevant periods therefore counted under section 14 and Article 8.
3. Missed opportunities and specialty. It was possible that Poland could have included the index offences in the 2013 extradition. There was also an unexplained failure between October 2013 and January 2016 to seek Germany’s consent under Article 27(3)(g) and (4) of the Framework Decision. After the 45-day period, however, a second extradition was legally available and was not inherently abusive or oppressive.
4. False sense of security. The appellant knew from October 2013, and again when released in January 2016, that Poland intended to prosecute him. There was no evidence that he had been told the matters were at an end. The circumstances therefore did not establish the false sense of security identified in Zapala v Poland [2017] EWHC 322 (Admin).
5. Section 14. The passage of time did not make extradition unjust because the alleged risks to trial fairness were speculative. Nor did it make extradition oppressive. The delay, missed opportunities, life changes and impact on the appellant were insufficient to meet the high threshold, particularly given the seriousness of the assault, the appellant’s awareness of the allegations, the absence of a false sense of security, and the public interest in prosecution.
6. Article 8. Extradition interfered with the appellant’s private and family life, but the interference was proportionate. The substantial public interests in honouring extradition obligations, mutual confidence and prosecution of serious offending outweighed the appellant’s settled life, employment, family connections and the lapse of time.
7. The court retook the section 14 and Article 8 assessments, upheld the District Judge’s outcome, and dismissed the appeal.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): the appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order was dismissed. The court retook the section 14 and Article 8 assessments and held that extradition remained permissible.