Szlichting v Circuit Court Zielona Gora

For dual criminality in extradition proceedings, the evidence must support the inevitable or only reasonable inference that the requested person was so intoxicated by drugs or drink as to be unfit to drive. Current statutory drug limits may assist that inference, but only where the substance identified is sufficiently established.

Under Article 8 ECHR, extradition will be disproportionate only in rare cases involving ordinary family circumstances. The court must balance the seriousness and circumstances of the offending against the effect on the requested person and family. A prior opportunity to refuse consent to prosecution for additional offences does not, without evidence of a legitimate sense of security, make subsequent extradition disproportionate.

The appellant challenged two extradition decisions made by District Judge Branston at Westminster Magistrates’ Court. The first concerned an accusation European arrest warrant for driving under the influence of drugs and falsely providing another person’s details. Permission to appeal was granted on the driving offence and an Article 8 ground.

The second concerned a conviction European arrest warrant seeking enforcement of sentences for supplying amphetamine and theft offences. The central issues were whether the driving allegation satisfied the dual-criminality requirement and whether extradition for the remaining offences would disproportionately interfere with the appellant’s private and family life.

1. Accusation warrant. The appeal succeeded only in relation to the driving offence. Section 10 and section 64 of the Extradition Act 2003 required the conduct to amount to an offence in England and Wales. Under section 4 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, the necessary inference was that the appellant was so intoxicated as to be unfit to drive. The comparison with the limits introduced by section 5A was open to the District Judge and could support an inference of impairment.
2. However, the warrant and further information did not clearly establish that the substance identified was delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol or another controlled drug relevant to the English offence. The appellant was therefore discharged on that offence because dual criminality was not met.
3. The appeal concerning the second offence was dismissed. The offence could properly be characterised as an attempt to pervert the course of justice and was not trivial.
4. Applying the Article 8 balancing approach required by Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), the seriousness of the offending, the public interest in extradition, the appellant’s previous convictions and his failure to resolve the outstanding matters outweighed the effects on his settled family life, wife and children. The delay was not unusually long in the extradition context.
5. The appellant had been entitled to refuse consent when extradited in 2013, and the Polish authorities could have sought consent to deal with the additional matters then. That did not establish that he had acquired a false sense of security, nor did it make extradition disproportionate. In ordinary circumstances, disproportionate interference under Article 8 would be very rare.
6. The application for permission to appeal against the conviction warrant was refused.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the challenge to the driving offence to the extent of discharging the appellant on that offence, dismissed the remainder of the appeal concerning the accusation warrant, and refused permission to appeal in relation to the conviction warrant.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Branston ordered extradition on 14 November 2016 under the accusation warrant and on 6 February 2017 under the conviction warrant.