Parsonage (acting as personal representative in the estate) v Parsonage & Ors

Testamentary capacity is governed by the common-law test requiring understanding of the will, the property being disposed of, the relevant claims, and the absence of a mental disorder causing an unsound disposition. Exact knowledge of an estate’s value is not always necessary where the testator’s governing objective is otherwise achieved. A solicitor’s involvement strengthens the evidence but creates no conclusive presumption of knowledge and approval. The court must assess the totality of the evidence. A will may therefore be invalid where a material misunderstanding of the estate and lifetime benefits defeats the testator’s declared intention.

The claimant, acting as personal representative, sought probate in solemn form of the deceased’s 2011 Will and removal of a caveat entered by the first defendant. The first defendant challenged the 2011 Will on testamentary-capacity grounds. Alternatively, the claimant challenged the deceased’s 2010 Will for want of knowledge and approval, alleging that its terms reflected a material misunderstanding of lifetime benefits received by the children and of the estate’s value. The court had to determine the validity of both wills.

Disposition. The claim succeeded. The 2011 Will was valid, the caveat was removed, and the court held that the 2010 Will was invalid for want of knowledge and approval.

1. Testamentary capacity. The court applied the common-law test in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, rather than the statutory test in sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The test required understanding of the nature and effect of the will, the extent of the property, the relevant claims, and freedom from a mental disorder causing an unsound disposition.
2. 2011 Will. The authorities did not impose a hard-and-fast requirement that the testator remember every earlier testamentary provision or receive assistance in every case. The approach was fact-sensitive, as illustrated by Simon v Byford [2013] EWHC 1490 (Ch) and Hoff v Atherton [2004] EWCA Civ 1554. The deceased understood that she was revoking the 2010 Will and directing the disposition of her estate. Her failure to appreciate a valuable contingent asset did not vitiate capacity because the 2011 Will placed the whole estate into residue for equal division between her children. Her dementia remained mild and did not cause provisions she would not have made in a sound state of mind.
3. Knowledge and approval. Knowledge meant knowing the contents of the will, while approval meant accepting it as the testamentary disposition to be given effect by execution. Following Gill v Woodall [2011] CH 380 and Hawes v Burgess [2013] EWCA Civ 94, the court assessed all relevant evidence and drew appropriate inferences. Proper execution, reading, and solicitor involvement received full weight but did not create a conclusive presumption.
4. 2010 Will. Despite the experienced solicitor’s involvement, the totality of the evidence showed that the deceased materially misunderstood the extent of her estate and the lifetime benefits received by her children. The will consequently produced substantial inequality inconsistent with her continuing objective of treating the children equally. She therefore did not know and approve its contents.