Venuscare Ltd v Cumbria County Council

A traffic authority making a traffic regulation order must be satisfied that the order is expedient for a purpose specified in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The authority must also perform the qualified duty under section 122 by considering traffic movement, the statutory factors and the purposes supporting the restriction, and balancing the competing considerations. Substance matters more than formal references to a balancing exercise. Reports are assessed fairly and as a whole. The court should not invalidate an order for minor omissions where the decision-maker had sufficient material, understood the issue and the outcome could not realistically have differed. A statutory challenge does not require the authority to address commercial consequences or speculative future redevelopment as separate statutory considerations.

The claimant challenged a traffic regulation order made by the defendant traffic authority in relation to Barton’s Place, an unadopted highway in Carlisle. The order restricted vehicular access at the northern end, subject to limited exceptions, and imposed one-way traffic at the southern end.

The challenge alleged absence of sufficient statutory traffic reasons, irrationality, mistake of fact, failure to perform the statutory balancing exercise and insufficient regard to the claimant’s rights and interests. The court considered the decision reports, the evidence before the committee and the statutory framework governing traffic regulation orders.

1. Claim dismissed. The order was within the statutory powers and the claimant had not established any material procedural or public law error.
2. Under section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, the authority had to be satisfied that the order was expedient for one or more specified purposes. The court could consider all material placed before the decision-maker. Although the reports did not identify every danger or explain the traffic justification with ideal precision, read fairly and as a whole they provided sufficient material. The committee could use its local knowledge and the surrounding evidence to understand the safety and unsuitable-use purposes.
3. The section 122 duty was qualified. The authority had to have regard, so far as practicable, to the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic, including pedestrians, together with the matters in section 122(2) and the purposes in section 1. Following Trail Riders Fellowship v Hampshire CC [2019] EWCA Civ 1275, the issue was whether the balancing exercise had been performed in substance. The reports, the committee’s consideration of access and traffic reasons, the minutes and the statement of reasons demonstrated substantial compliance.
4. Applying the principles summarised in Mansell v Tonbridge & Malling BC [2017] EWCA Civ 1314, the reports were not materially misleading. They were to be read with reasonable benevolence, and only a material defect capable of affecting the decision would justify intervention.
5. The differing restrictions along Barton’s Place were not irrational. The northern restriction permitted only limited access traffic, the middle section was more open and the southern restriction reflected the traffic conditions there. The court’s role was not to substitute its own view for that of the committee.
6. The alleged mistake of fact was either not established or immaterial. The claimant’s current access was considered, while speculative commercial effects of future redevelopment were not matters the authority was required to treat as determinative. The court also applied the approach in E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49 to material-fact allegations and the approach in Hijazi [2003] EWCA Civ 692 concerning evidence explaining material before the decision-maker.
7. Even if a report omission had been established, the court would have declined to quash the order because there was no realistic prospect of a different decision.