A&E Baines v The North Yorkshire Council

A statutory challenge to a traffic regulation order succeeds only on the grounds permitted by Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The court must assess the order in its statutory and factual context, including the wider scheme which it is intended to implement. A scheme may be implemented incrementally where there is an intention to bring the necessary measures into force together. Consultation on traffic regulation orders need not reopen an earlier decision to adopt the wider scheme. Under section 122, the authority must identify the statutory traffic duty, consider factors favouring restriction, and balance the competing considerations. The court does not reweigh evaluative judgments or require every potentially desirable enquiry. Required traffic signage is necessary before an order comes into force and, without it, non-compliance does not constitute an offence.

The applicant, a Harrogate property management company, challenged four traffic regulation orders made by North Yorkshire Council on 10 January 2025. The orders concerned bus and cycle lanes, one-way traffic arrangements and turning restrictions on and around Lower Station Parade. They formed part of the Revised Harrogate Station Gateway Scheme, previously approved by the Council in November 2023.

The challenge alleged inadequate consultation, unlawful implementation of only part of the scheme, misleading consultation material, failure to consider relevant matters and inadequate reasons. The applicant also sought to amend one ground to contend that the Council had unlawfully implemented only part of the scheme without certainty that the remainder would follow.

1. Application refused. The amendment to ground 2 was permitted, but all grounds failed. The traffic regulation orders stood, although they had not yet come into force because the required signage had not been provided.
2. The statutory challenge was confined to whether the orders were within the powers conferred by the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. A failure to comply with procedural requirements could justify relief only if the applicant had suffered substantial prejudice. No such prejudice was established.
3. The November 2023 resolution authorised the orders and did not require further consultation on the already adopted scheme. “Public engagement” did not necessarily mean consultation. Any challenge to the adequacy of consultation preceding adoption of the scheme belonged to a prompt judicial review of that earlier decision.
4. It was not irrational to prepare and make the orders incrementally. The relevant measures were not in force without signage, the remaining parking order was still being progressed, and there was no decision or intention that only part of the scheme would permanently operate.
5. The consultation concerned the traffic regulation orders, with the wider scheme supplied as context. The Council was entitled to consider the scheme’s benefits while treating objections directed solely to the scheme as outside the consultation’s subject matter. The consultation document was not materially misleading, and no material prejudice was shown.
6. The officer’s report supplied adequate reasons and addressed the material objections. Applying Trail Riders Fellowship, the Council had actually conducted the section 122 balancing exercise. The court would not substitute its view on evidence, policy or evaluative judgment, and the evidence-gathering challenge did not meet the Tameside threshold.
7. Heritage matters could not lawfully weigh against the proposed orders within the section 122 balance. The “other matters” limb operated only among factors favouring restriction of traffic. Promotion of the wider scheme was, however, a relevant consideration supporting the orders.

First-instance statutory challenge in the High Court (Administrative Court). No prior appellate decision was stated in the judgment.