Dodsworth & Graham-Burrows v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police

Under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, the court must first determine whether a destruction order is required. Only if it is satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety may it decline that order and proceed to a contingent destruction order.

The dog’s temperament and past behaviour must be considered. The fitness and propriety of the owner or keeper is a relevant, but not formally conclusive, consideration. The assessment is fact-sensitive and appellate courts should interfere only for legal error or a conclusion outside the reasonable range. A failure to comply with exemption conditions may justify finding a proposed keeper unfit, even where the dog has no history of aggression.

These were two appeals by way of case stated from decisions of Leeds Crown Court, which had upheld destruction orders made by magistrates under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.

The appeals concerned three dogs identified as pit bull terriers. The common issues included the statutory sequence for destruction and contingent destruction orders, the meaning and application of the requirement that an owner or keeper be a fit and proper person, the assessment of danger to public safety, case-stated procedure, adjournments, and alleged interference with rights under Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention.

1. Disposition. Both appeals were dismissed and the Crown Court’s decisions were affirmed. The court found no error of law in either case.
2. Statutory sequence. Under section 4B, where release would contravene section 1(3), destruction is required unless the court is satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. Only after declining destruction may the court make a contingent destruction order. The statutory scheme does not permit the court to choose a contingent order merely because it considers that conditions might adequately protect the public.
3. Fit and proper person. The phrase comprises ordinary words applied in a fact-sensitive way. It concerns the person’s likely willingness, awareness, practical ability and capacity to control the dog and comply with the exemption regime. Character and past conduct may be relevant, but previous convictions are not an automatic bar. The assessment concerns fitness at the hearing and is a mixed question of law and fact.
4. Danger to public safety. Fitness and propriety is one consideration within the wider question. The court must also consider temperament and past behaviour and may consider other relevant circumstances. A favourable temperament assessment does not compel the conclusion that the dog would not constitute a danger. The overall balance is for the trial court, and an appellate court should interfere only where the conclusion was not reasonably open to it.
5. Application. The Crown Court was entitled to rely on breaches of insurance, address and other exemption requirements, the condition of premises, antecedents and evidence bearing on the proposed keepers’ ability and willingness to comply. It was also entitled to consider earlier conditions even though the premises were later improved.
6. Convention rights and procedure. The statutory scheme was, in principle, compatible with Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. The stated cases did not provide sufficient facts to establish engagement beyond the ordinary case, and no disproportionate interference was shown. The court also declined to answer academic questions concerning alternative keepers and China, who had died in police custody.

• Leeds Magistrates Court: destruction orders were made in respect of the dogs under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.
• Leeds Crown Court: on 27 October 2017, the appeals were dismissed and the destruction orders upheld.
• High Court (Administrative Court): the case-stated appeals were dismissed and the Crown Court decisions affirmed.