Golding, R (On the Application Of) v Crown Court Sitting At Maidstone

Under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, a court must order the destruction of a prohibited dog unless satisfied that the particular dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. That assessment must focus on the matters specified in section 4B(2A): the dog’s temperament, past behaviour, and the fitness of its owner or keeper, together with any other relevant circumstances bearing on the dog’s dangerousness.

Mandatory exemption controls, such as muzzling, leads, secure conditions and neutering, operate only after the court has concluded that the dog is not dangerous. They are safeguards attached to exemption and cannot be used to qualify the prior assessment of danger. The court’s conclusion on dangerousness was therefore upheld.

The claimant sought judicial review of the decision of the Crown Court sitting at Maidstone, which upheld a magistrates’ order for the destruction of Harry, a pit bull type dog seized without any prosecution. The Crown Court concluded that it could not be satisfied that Harry would not constitute a danger to public safety.

The claimant argued that the court should have taken account of the mandatory controls attached to exemption under the Dangerous Dogs Exemption Scheme (England and Wales) Order 2014, described in the judgment as the 2015 Order. She also challenged the conclusion on dangerousness as perverse. The central issue was the proper approach to section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Crown Court had adopted the correct approach to section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.
2. Section 4B establishes a sequential scheme. For a seized prohibited dog, the court must order destruction unless satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. Only after deciding not to order destruction does the court proceed to make a contingent destruction order under section 4B(3), allowing time for exemption.
3. The assessment of danger under section 4B(2A) is directed to the particular dog and its owner or keeper. The court must consider the dog’s temperament and past behaviour and whether the owner or person in charge is fit and proper. It may consider other relevant circumstances, but those circumstances must bear on the dog’s dangerousness.
4. Controls imposed by the exemption scheme, including neutering, muzzling, use of a lead and secure conditions, are conceptually distinct. They reduce risk and provide safeguards after a finding that the dog is not dangerous. They do not qualify the prior statutory assessment and cannot be treated as relevant circumstances for that purpose.
5. The court accepted the approach in R (Grant) v Sheffield Crown Court [2017] EWHC 1678. The reasoning in R v Flack [2008] Cr App R (S) 70 concerned non-prohibited dogs and did not govern section 4B. Although R v Baballa [2010] EWCA Crim 1950 appeared to require consideration of exemption controls in criminal proceedings, it did not decide the proper approach to civil orders under section 4B and could not be read across to that context.
6. The Crown Court was entitled to rely on the expert evidence of aggression towards the expert and another dog. Behaviour commonly seen in young dogs may nevertheless be relevant when exhibited by a prohibited dog. The factual conclusions could not be impeached on judicial review.

The judgment itself describes the underlying procedural history:

• Magistrates’ court: made an immediate destruction order under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.
• Crown Court sitting at Maidstone: upheld the destruction order on 19 October 2018.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the judicial review challenge. The application had initially challenged the refusal to state a case, but permission was granted for the claim to continue as a challenge to the substantive decision.