Kayleigh Dawson, R (on the application of) v Preston Crown Court

On judicial review of a Crown Court decision under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, the High Court must review for public law error, not substitute its own merits assessment. The statutory question is whether the court is satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety, having regard to temperament, past behaviour, the owner’s fitness and propriety, and any other relevant circumstances.

Compliance with exemption conditions operates on a strict-liability basis. Even where a first breach has ended the exemption, later non-conformity remains capable of informing the danger assessment. The statutory scheme does not impose a guarantee of zero risk, but the absence of such a guarantee may be relevant alongside the dog’s behaviour, temperament and the protective conditions.

The claimant challenged the Preston Crown Court’s dismissal of her rehearing appeal against an immediate destruction order made by Burnley Magistrates’ Court concerning her prohibited-type pit bull terrier, Lightning. The Crown Court had concluded that she had not established, on the balance of probabilities, that Lightning would not constitute a danger to public safety.

The Crown Court refused to state a case under section 28 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The Administrative Court therefore considered whether the refusal and the underlying judgment involved a material public law error. With the parties’ consent, the court directly addressed the substance of the challenge.

1. Outcome. The claim was dismissed. The Crown Court’s decision was upheld, with no order as to costs.
2. The High Court applied the conventional public law standard. It did not exercise a substitutionary jurisdiction based on disagreement with the Crown Court’s evaluative conclusion. The issue was whether the decision was unlawful, unfair or unreasonable, or rested on insufficient evidence.
3. Under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, the court had to decide whether it was satisfied that Lightning would not constitute a danger to public safety. It was required to consider the dog’s temperament and past behaviour and whether the claimant was a fit and proper person to be in charge of him. It could also consider any other relevant circumstances. The Crown Court had addressed those matters and was entitled to reject the defence expert’s opinion, giving cogent reasons based on the attack and the possible causes of the behaviour.
4. The conditions attached to a certificate of exemption were strict-liability obligations. Although the first breach triggered the statutory prohibition and meant that later events could not technically be breaches of an extant exemption, later non-conformity with understood protective conditions remained relevant. The court could consider the whole sequence of events when assessing danger to public safety, independently of the fit-and-proper-person question.
5. The Crown Court had not applied an impermissible standard of perfection. It recognised that no dog could be guaranteed never to attack, but was entitled to treat the absence of a guarantee as relevant in the context of Lightning’s serious attack, his temperament, his status as a prohibited-type dog, and the slippage in compliance. R v Singh was distinguishable because it concerned different facts, an inadequately reasoned destruction order and an overturned finding that the owner was not fit and proper.

• Preston Crown Court: dismissed the claimant’s rehearing appeal against the immediate destruction order made by Burnley Magistrates’ Court on 4 May 2021. The Crown Court later refused to state a case.
• High Court (Administrative Court): directly considered the underlying public law challenge and dismissed the claim, upholding the Crown Court’s decision.