Kayleigh Dawson, R (on the application of) v Crown Court Sitting at Preston

Under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, destruction of a prohibited dog is the default where release would contravene the statutory prohibition, unless the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. The court must consider temperament, past behaviour and the keeper’s fitness, and may consider other relevant circumstances. The same public-safety test applies regardless of the dog’s type. It does not require elimination of every conceivable risk. The court left open whether future contingent destruction order conditions must be considered, but held that, even assuming they were relevant, they had been considered and found inadequate. A carefully reasoned evaluative decision supported by evidence is not unlawful on judicial review.

Lightning, a pit bull terrier type dog, was seized after escaping and attacking another dog and its keeper. The Crown Court at Preston upheld a destruction order made under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 and later refused to state a case. On judicial review, Fordham J addressed the substantive complaints and dismissed the claim in [2023] EWHC 497 (Admin).

The appeal raised five grounds concerning the statutory test, the treatment of factual findings, the relevance of the appellant’s compliance history, the analogy with R v Singh, and the relevance of existing or future safeguards under a contingent destruction order.

Lord Justice Stuart-Smith gave the substantive judgment. Lady Justice Macur and Lord Justice Lewison agreed. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Statutory framework. Under section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, where a prohibited dog cannot lawfully be released, destruction is required unless the court is satisfied, on the civil standard and with the burden on the owner, that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. The court must consider temperament, past behaviour and whether the keeper is fit and proper, and may consider other relevant circumstances.
2. Contingent destruction orders. The court declined to decide whether future conditions attached to a contingent destruction order necessarily fall within other relevant circumstances. The issue was left open because, assuming the appellant’s submission to be correct, the Crown Court had expressly considered the muzzle, lead and security requirements. It was entitled to conclude that previous compliance slippage and the circumstances that had allowed the escape did not provide adequate assurance. The reasoning in R v Flack [2008] EWCA Crim 304, R v Baballa [2010] EWCA Crim 1950 and R v Hill [2010] EWCA Crim 2999 was not finally resolved. The reasoning in R (Grant) v Crown Court at Sheffield [2017] EWHC (Admin) 1678 and Hunter v Procurator Fiscal [2019] HCJAC 19 was regarded as highly persuasive.
3. Grounds 1 to 3. The Crown Court had not applied a higher standard to a prohibited dog. The statutory question was the same for every dog. The absence of a guarantee was relevant because Lightning had previously displayed dangerous behaviour. The attack occurred on the only occasion on which he had been at large in public without a lead and muzzle. The compliance breaches were not treated as criticisms of the appellant’s fitness; they showed that accidents and future slippage could occur.
4. Ground 4. R v Singh [2013] EWCA Crim 2416 was distinguishable. That destruction order had been quashed because the lower court had failed to give reasons, failed to weigh positive evidence and failed to address proposed safeguards. Here, the Crown Court gave a careful and sufficient evaluative assessment. Other cases were not guidelines on the injury severity required. The statutory question was fact-sensitive.
5. Judicial review. The High Court and Court of Appeal were not entitled to substitute their own merits assessment. The Crown Court’s reasons were sufficient, its conclusion was supported by the evidence and fell within the bounds of reasonableness, and its refusal to state a case was lawful.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Appeal dismissed on 6 February 2024.
2. High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court. Fordham J dismissed the judicial review claim in [2023] EWHC 497 (Admin) after addressing the substantive complaints against the Crown Court judgment.
3. Crown Court sitting at Preston. The appellant’s appeal against the destruction order was dismissed. The Crown Court later refused to state a case for the opinion of the High Court.