Feyziyev v Radu

A truth defence in a defamation claim should proceed to trial where the pleading identifies the material facts relied on and is supported by evidence capable of establishing the pleaded case. At an interlocutory stage, the court must consider the defence as a whole and should not conduct a mini-trial. Complex inferential issues, including the significance of payments, corporate connections, third-party conduct and the claimant’s state of knowledge, ordinarily require full investigation at trial. A defendant must prove the primary facts supporting truth; it is insufficient merely to show reasonable grounds for suspecting those facts. A late application to strike out or obtain summary judgment may itself support refusal of the application.

The claimant brought a defamation claim concerning two articles. Warby J had determined that the articles conveyed that there were reasonable or strong grounds to suspect that the claimant, through Avromed, had engaged or assisted in large-scale illegal money laundering and bribery.

The defendant pleaded truth under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013. The claimant applied to strike out that defence or obtain summary judgment. The application challenged the alleged Azerbaijani Laundromat, Avromed’s involvement, the claimant’s knowledge or alleged gross negligence, the treatment of third-party conduct, and the adequacy of the evidence and pleading. The central issue was whether the defence was sufficiently pleaded and evidenced to justify proceeding to trial.

1. Application dismissed. The defendant was entitled to run the truth defence to trial.
2. The court applied the established approach to pleading and evidence. The defendant must plead with precision the primary facts and acts relied on to justify the defamatory meaning. It is insufficient merely to prove reasonable grounds for suspecting primary facts. The burden remains on the defendant and must not be transferred in substance to the claimant.
3. On an application under CPR Part 3.4 or Part 24, the court must not conduct a mini-trial. Summary judgment should be refused where fuller investigation of the facts at trial is warranted, although the court should determine a short point of law or construction that is decisive.
4. The allegations concerning the Laundromat were sufficiently clear and supported by a strong inferential case. The existence and criminal activities of the Laundromat depended on multiple sources of evidence and required the full picture at trial. The allegations concerning payments involving Avromed companies were also sufficiently particularised. Whether those payments supported an inference of involvement, or had an innocent explanation, was for trial.
5. The pleaded facts concerning the claimant’s role, knowledge and continuing connection with Avromed were capable of amounting to conduct which could reasonably cause suspicion to fall on him. The court could not conclude at that stage that this part of the defence had no reasonable prospect of success.
6. It remained unresolved whether constructive knowledge or gross negligence would suffice to establish criminal involvement through engagement or assistance in illegal money laundering. If maintained, that issue, together with any pleaded breach of duty, was for the trial judge.
7. The claimant’s delay in making the application, when the shape of the defence had been known for months and trial was imminent, supported dismissal. The court expressed no view on the merits of the truth defence.

This was a first-instance interlocutory decision. The judgment records an earlier meaning ruling by Warby J in [2019] EWHC 957 (QB); no appeal history is stated.