Otuo v The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Britain (Rev 1)

Religious bodies do not enjoy general immunity from defamation claims merely because the publication arose from an internal religious decision. Claims vindicating civil rights should generally be determined, even where the court must examine objectively ascertainable rules or practices, unless determination requires adjudication on the validity of religious beliefs or rites, or another matter inherently incapable of objective assessment.

A court may assess whether religious actors acted honestly, and whether publishers and recipients had corresponding duties or interests for qualified privilege. It need not determine whether a religious belief was true. Case management powers may be used to remove prolix, argumentative or disproportionate pleading, including detailed religious procedural material which does not materially bear on malice.

The claimant brought two slander actions concerning statements made at meetings of Jehovah’s Witnesses announcing his disfellowship and considering his reinstatement. He alleged that the statements conveyed imputations of fraud. The defendants applied to dismiss the claims, or parts of them, as non-justiciable because they concerned religious doctrine and membership decisions. They also applied under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (c) to strike out parts of the claimant’s Replies.

Earlier applications had been adjourned or dismissed as premature while the pleadings were clarified. The issues before the court were whether either slander claim was inherently non-justiciable and, if not, which parts of the Replies should be removed for lack of reasonable grounds, abuse or non-compliance.

1. Justiciability. The claims were not, in themselves, non-justiciable. Defamation is a civil claim protecting reputation, and the pleaded claims did not require the court to decide the validity of religious beliefs or rites. Religious bodies had no absolute privilege for statements made in an official religious setting.
2. The distinction was between adjudicating religious belief or practice as such and determining their civil consequences. The court could consider objectively ascertainable rules, the existence or sincerity of beliefs, and whether a defendant acted honestly. It could not determine the truth or validity of religious doctrine. The claims did not amount to a collateral attack on the claimant’s disfellowship.
3. The pleaded issues were capable of objective determination. The limited justification defence did not require adjudication on religious doctrine. Consent might require examination of asserted rules, but not evaluation of their religious validity. Qualified privilege principally turned on whether publishers and recipients had corresponding duties or interests. Procedural irregularity was relevant, if at all, to malice. Malice principally concerned whether the defendants knew the claimant had not committed fraud, or honestly believed that he had.
4. The defendants’ proposed hypothetical justification defence could not support dismissal. No draft pleading or evidence established that such a defence would have been advanced or that it would create an untriable issue. The limited non-justiciability pleas in the Defences could be addressed at trial and did not justify a stay or strike-out.
5. Strike-out. Under CPR 3.4, the court could remove parts of statements of case which disclosed no reasonable grounds, obstructed the just disposal of the proceedings, or failed to comply with a rule, practice direction or order. Consistently with PD53, the Replies had to be concise and confined to material facts. The court therefore struck out the passages identified in the Appendix, including repetitive argument, evidence, generalised character allegations, and disproportionate accounts of religious procedure.
6. The detailed pleading concerning the biblical Two Witness Rule and Matthew 18 was not justiciable and was in any event incapable of adding proportionate value to the malice case. The applications were allowed to that extent; the claims themselves were not dismissed.

This was a first-instance decision during a prolonged pre-trial review. Earlier procedural rulings included decisions by HHJ Moloney QC, Sir David Eady and HHJ Parkes QC concerning the timing and form of applications and the adequacy of the pleadings. The court also referred to a separate ruling on relief from sanctions, [2018] EWHC 341 (QB).