Byczak v Polish Judicial Authority

On an appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court may interfere with a magistrates’ court decision only where it was wrong. Findings of primary fact reached after hearing evidence ordinarily require respect, and it is insufficient that the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion. In a conviction warrant case, the court must balance the public interest in giving effect to extradition against the requested person’s and family’s rights under Article 8 ECHR. Extradition must proceed unless it would cause a disproportionate detrimental impact on family rights or breach domestic law. Time spent in custody in the United Kingdom must be deducted from the sentence remaining to be served in the requesting state.

The claimant appealed, with permission, against District Judge Ikram’s order at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 7 May 2019 for his extradition to Poland under a conviction European Arrest Warrant. The warrant concerned a 2009 assault for which a suspended sentence had later been activated after the claimant’s subsequent offending. The claimant challenged findings that he was a fugitive and argued that extradition would disproportionately interfere with his and his family’s Article 8 rights, particularly in view of delay and time spent in custody in the United Kingdom. He also sought to adduce further evidence.

The central issues were whether the additional evidence was admissible, whether the District Judge’s decision was wrong, and whether extradition would produce a disproportionate interference with family life.

1. Fresh evidence. The application under section 27(4)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003 was refused. The additional statement was not fresh because the claimant had been available and had already given evidence at the magistrates’ court. It could have been raised earlier and added nothing material.
2. Appellate approach. Applying Celinski & others v Poland [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), the question under sections 26 to 29 of the Act was whether the District Judge had made the wrong decision. Findings reached after hearing evidence should ordinarily be respected. The appellate court must focus on the decision itself and cannot interfere merely because it might have reached different findings on the primary facts.
3. Fugitive status. The District Judge was entitled to infer from the claimant’s participation in the proceedings and continuing contact with his probation officer that he knew of the later appeal hearing at which the suspended sentence was activated. The finding was not arguably wrong.
4. Article 8 balance. The District Judge had carried out the required balancing exercise between the public interest in giving effect to a valid conviction warrant and the claimant’s and his family’s rights. The offence was sufficiently serious to have resulted in imprisonment, and the claimant’s subsequent offending had led to activation of the suspended sentence. The delay and family circumstances did not make extradition disproportionate.
5. Custody credit and disposition. Article 26 of the Framework Decision 2002 required time spent in custody in the United Kingdom pursuant to execution of the warrant to be deducted from the sentence to be served in Poland. The appeal was refused.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court extradition order refused.