Solicitors Regulation Authority v Good

An appellate court reviewing a specialist disciplinary tribunal must exercise particular caution, but it should intervene where the tribunal has made an error of principle or reached an evaluative conclusion outside the proper range. Applying the two-stage test in Ivey v Genting Casinos Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, the tribunal had failed to take account of its own findings that the solicitor knowingly and deliberately pursued excessive bills. Its conclusion that he was not dishonest was fundamentally flawed. The fact that excessive costs were not ultimately recovered, and that safeguards existed, went to mitigation rather than honesty. Serious lack of integrity in rendering knowingly excessive bills may also require striking off where a fine would undermine public confidence in the profession.

The Solicitors Regulation Authority appealed under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 against the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s judgment dated 10 September 2018. The tribunal found that Andrew Mark Cyril Good had deliberately instituted charging practices involving excessive hourly rates and automatic 100% success fees, in breach of the SRA Principles 2011, but rejected an allegation of dishonesty and imposed a £30,000 fine. The SRA challenged both the finding of honesty and, alternatively, the leniency of the sanction. The central issues were whether the tribunal had properly applied the test in Ivey v Genting Casinos Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, and whether its sanction was clearly inappropriate.

1. Appeal allowed. The court set aside the tribunal’s finding that Mr Good was not dishonest, substituted a finding that dishonesty was proved beyond reasonable doubt, quashed the £30,000 fine and ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors.
2. The appeal was by way of review. The court would interfere with the tribunal’s findings only for an error of principle or where the evaluation fell outside the bounds of what the tribunal could properly and reasonably decide. Similar restraint applied to sanction, which involved specialist evaluative judgment.
3. The tribunal had misapplied both stages of the Ivey v Genting Casinos Ltd [2017] UKSC 67 test. It failed, at the subjective stage, to bring into account its own findings that Mr Good knew the rates and success fee were excessive, had deliberately designed the charging policy, restricted independent scrutiny and disregarded critical comments. It did not make a proper finding that his asserted belief was genuine.
4. The tribunal’s implied finding that Mr Good genuinely believed he was entitled to charge the rates was irreconcilable with its finding that, after the relevant detailed assessment, any such belief was maintained solely to justify continued overcharging. The finding that the rate had been set artificially high to maximise costs without regard to reasonableness or proportionality was likewise inconsistent with a genuine belief.
5. The fact that the bills were subject to challenge, that excessive costs were not ultimately recovered, and that rates were later reduced could mitigate the gravity of the conduct but could not make it honest. Applying the objective standards of ordinary decent people to the established facts, dishonesty was the only proper conclusion.
6. Even if the conduct had amounted only to lack of integrity, the tribunal had materially miscalibrated its seriousness. The planned and deliberate policy, disregard of applicable requirements and risk to confidence in solicitors’ bills made the misconduct particularly grave. In such circumstances, the reasoning in Solicitors Regulation Authority v Emeana [2013] EWHC 2130 (Admin) supported striking off as necessary to protect the reputation of the profession.

• High Court (Administrative Court), Divisional Court: The appeal against the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s judgment dated 10 September 2018 was allowed. The finding of no dishonesty was replaced by a finding of dishonesty, and the £30,000 fine was replaced by striking off.
• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: Allegations of lack of integrity and breach of public trust were proved, but dishonesty was rejected and a £30,000 fine imposed.