The Law Society (Solicitors Regulation Authority) v Emeana & Ors

In professional disciplinary appeals, the court may intervene where the sanction imposed by an expert tribunal is clearly inappropriate. Striking off is not reserved for dishonesty. A solicitor whose conduct demonstrates a serious lack of integrity, probity or trustworthiness may require removal from the Roll, even where dishonesty is neither alleged nor proved. The court must assess the misconduct as a whole, including its cumulative effect on public protection and the reputation of the profession. Comparisons with sanctions imposed in other cases provide limited assistance because disciplinary sentences are not precedents and exact uniformity is impossible.

The Solicitors Regulation Authority appealed against sanctions imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in five disciplinary matters concerning three solicitors. The Tribunal had imposed fines on Mr Ajanaku and Mr Emeana, and an overall six-month suspension on Mr Ijewere.

The misconduct included participation in a sham partnership, failures concerning client accounts and supervision, misleading information to regulators and lender clients, breaches of undertakings, and involvement in mortgage transactions bearing the hallmarks of fraud. The central issue was whether the sanctions were clearly inappropriate because they failed to reflect the gravity of the respondents’ conduct viewed cumulatively.

1. The appeals were allowed. Mr Ajanaku, Mr Emeana and Mr Ijewere were ordered to be struck off the Roll of solicitors.

2. The court respected the expertise of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, but applied the test in Law Society v Salsbury [2008] EWCA Civ 1285: intervention is required where the sanction is clearly inappropriate. The appellate court is not confined to exceptional or very strong cases.

3. The governing principle is that the profession requires complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness, as explained in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 1286. A lapse in those standards may justify striking off although dishonesty is not proved. Striking off is not limited to dishonest conduct.

4. Sanction must be assessed by reference to the respondent’s professional misconduct as a whole. The Tribunal had considered each allegation carefully and had calculated overall sanctions, but had lost sight of the cumulative gravity of the misconduct and its effect on public confidence and protection.

5. Mr Ajanaku’s persistent disregard of regulatory rules across two firms, the sham partnership, responsibility for serious client-account deficits and involvement in mortgage transactions bearing the hallmarks of fraud justified striking off. The sham partnership alone was sufficient to justify removal for both Mr Ajanaku and Mr Emeana, since it enabled an unqualified solicitor to practise as a de facto sole principal.

6. Mr Emeana’s conduct showed no adequate appreciation of the standards of integrity and trustworthiness required of the profession. His misleading answers to the regulator aggravated the misconduct, since professional self-regulation depends on frank and honest co-operation.

7. Mr Ijewere’s breaches of undertakings, misleading statements about partners, failure to rectify debit balances and involvement in transactions bearing the hallmarks of fraud could not properly be met by a fine or a short suspension. His failure to explain his motivation or state of mind did not justify leniency.

8. The court noted that personal mitigation could justify suspension where striking off would otherwise be appropriate only if compelling or exceptional mitigation existed and there was a realistic prospect of recovery or improvement. No such mitigation was established.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeals by the Solicitors Regulation Authority against sanctions imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal were allowed. The fines imposed on Mr Ajanaku and Mr Emeana, and the six-month suspension imposed on Mr Ijewere, were replaced by orders striking each respondent off the Roll.