Layne v Attorney General of Grenada

For admission to the Bar under the Legal Profession Act 2011, “good character” is a condition of eligibility, not a residual discretion. The Supreme Court must evaluate the applicant’s character at the date of decision, considering both the applicant’s attributes, including relevant past conduct and rehabilitation, and whether admission would objectively risk damage to public confidence in the profession. Public confidence must be well-founded; evidence of individual witnesses’ opinions is not decisive. A serious conviction, particularly for murder, creates a high hurdle and admission will be rare, but the conviction is not an automatic bar. The appeal was dismissed because the lower judge’s decision, read as a whole, applied those considerations and contained no material reviewable error.

Mr Joseph Ewart Layne, one of the Grenada 17, was convicted of murders committed during political violence in 1983 and served 26 years’ imprisonment. After obtaining legal qualifications and presenting substantial evidence of rehabilitation, he applied in 2013 for admission as an attorney-at-law in Grenada under section 17(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2011.

The Supreme Court refused the application, relying on the seriousness of the convictions and the risk of damage to public confidence in the legal profession. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision, accepting that the evidence of rehabilitation was overwhelming but applying appellate restraint. The Privy Council considered the meaning and timing of “good character”, the relevance of public confidence, whether the court had a residual discretion to refuse admission, and whether the lower courts had made reviewable errors.

Majority

1. Disposition. By a majority comprising Lady Arden, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption and Lady Black, the Board advised that the appeal be dismissed.
2. Statutory task. Under section 17(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2011, good character is assessed at the date of the Supreme Court’s decision and in the context of practice as an attorney-at-law. The function is judicial evaluation, not the exercise of a residual discretion. Once the statutory requirements are assessed, the court has no additional power of choice under section 17(1).
3. Two facets of good character. The inquiry concerns both the candidate’s attributes and the risk of damage to public confidence in the profession. Convictions and subsequent conduct, including rehabilitation, are relevant to the first facet. The second facet requires an objective assessment of whether public confidence can reasonably be expected. Actual public opinion, or evidence from respected witnesses, is not determinative where it is not objectively justified.
4. Professional context. Admission to the Bar is not purely a private matter. Attorneys have duties to the court and an important role in maintaining the rule of law. The public-confidence requirement therefore legitimately forms part of good character for admission.
5. Serious convictions. Murder convictions create a high hurdle. Even exemplary conduct after the offences may not satisfy the good-character condition, and admission will be rare. The convictions were not treated as an automatic bar, however. The judge considered the evidence of rehabilitation, and her analogy with disbarment was unnecessary and did not undermine the decision. Her failure to make an express finding was not material because she had impliedly found that the condition was not established.
6. Conviction validity. The Board proceeded on the basis that the convictions stood unless set aside. The different approach in Selwyn Strachan v The Law Society turned on that case’s special facts.

Dissent. Lord Kerr agreed that the task involved judgment rather than discretion, but considered that past conduct could bear only on present character and could never constitute an automatically insuperable bar. He rejected speculation about public reaction and would have allowed the appeal and remitted the application for reconsideration.

• Privy Council: In [2019] UKPC 11, the appeal was dismissed.
• Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court: The appeal was dismissed and the refusal of admission was upheld, notwithstanding the court’s view that the evidence of rehabilitation was overwhelming.
• Supreme Court of Grenada and the West Indies Associated States High Court of Justice: The application for admission as an attorney-at-law was refused under section 17(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2011.