Seukeran Singh v Commissioner of Police

An officer may write the qualifying examination for promotion within the First Division while still serving probation in the existing office. The governing scheme contains no legal bar against this. The provision addressing promotion before completion of probation would be unnecessary if probationers were ineligible to sit the examination.

Eligibility to enter the promotional assessment process is distinct from entitlement to demand admission to it. The Commissioner’s management powers are not limited unless the Act or Regulations clearly impose a limitation. The examination provisions establish the process and a points threshold, but do not themselves confer an individual right to sit the examination.

The respondent, a Superintendent of Police, was invited to sit the qualifying examination for promotion to Senior Superintendent. The invitation was withdrawn because he had not completed 12 months’ probation in his existing office. He sat the examination after interim relief and was placed fifth on the Order of Merit List.

The High Court dismissed his judicial review claim in 2010 and, after remittal for further evidence, maintained that decision in 2013. The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal in December 2015, with fuller reasons in July 2018, declaring the Commissioner’s decision null and void and ultra vires the Police Service Act and Police Service Regulations 2007. The central issues were whether probation prevented eligibility to sit the examination and whether a qualifying officer was entitled to sit it.

Appeal dismissed. The Board upheld the declaration that the Commissioner’s decision was null and void and ultra vires the Police Service Act and the Police Service Regulations 2007. The Commissioner was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal, subject to written submissions.

1. Eligibility. The statutory scheme imposed express restrictions on promotion, including the points threshold in section 16(2) of the Police Service Act and the service requirement in regulation 17. It imposed no restriction based on incomplete probation. Regulation 21(4) expressly contemplated promotion before completion of probation in the former office. Since promotion in both Divisions was preceded by a qualifying examination, the provision was incompatible with a general legal bar on probationers sitting that examination.
2. Error of law. The Commissioner had proceeded on the basis that the respondent was legally ineligible, rather than applying a management policy. That interpretation was not open to him and amounted to a clear error of law. The Court of Appeal was therefore right to grant relief.
3. Eligibility and entitlement distinguished. The question whether a probationary officer could require permission to sit the examination was academic and was not decided. The Board nevertheless expressed the provisional view that the Commissioner’s powers in relation to promotion should not be treated as limited unless the limitation was clearly spelled out. Regulation 19(5) concerned the structure of the assessment process. Even if a qualifying officer meant one who had attained 60 or more appraisal points, the provision created a condition precedent to entry, not an entitlement to sit.
4. Constitutional balance. The Board gave full weight to the independence of the Police Service, a principle associated with Endell Thomas v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [1982] AC 113. It also noted the Commissioner’s statutory veto over First Division appointments and the appeal structure to the Police Service Commission.

• Privy Council: appeal dismissed. [2019] UKPC 26.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: allowed the respondent’s appeal in December 2015 and declared the Commissioner’s decision null and void and ultra vires the Act and Regulations. Fuller reasons were given on 16 July 2018.
• High Court: dismissed the judicial review claim in April 2010. Following remittal for further evidence, the judge maintained that decision in March 2013.