AB Volvo (Publ) & Ors v Ryder Ltd & Ors

EU law does not prevent a national court from applying domestic abuse-of-process rules to facts admitted in a European Commission settlement decision but not essential to its operative part. A settlement decision is a final decision for that purpose.

Where different parties are involved in later proceedings, relitigation is abusive only if it would be manifestly unfair or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. That high threshold may be met where addressees, having freely admitted facts with procedural safeguards and obtained substantial settlement benefits, seek to put damages claimants to proof of those facts. Legitimate corrections and newly available evidence may nevertheless justify departure from an admitted fact.

The respondents brought seven follow-on competition damages claims, alleging that prices paid for trucks were inflated by an infringement established in a European Commission settlement decision. The truck manufacturers had admitted the facts outlined in that decision and obtained a 10% reduction in their fines.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal held in [2020] CAT 7 that Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 made the essential supporting recitals binding. It further held that contesting admitted, non-essential facts would ordinarily be an abuse of process, subject to specified gateways.

The manufacturers appealed. The central issues were whether EU law precluded the domestic doctrine, whether the settlement decision was sufficiently final, whether the required high threshold had been met, and whether a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice was necessary.

1. The appeals were dismissed. EU law did not preclude application of the English doctrine of abuse of process to non-essential facts admitted in a Commission settlement decision. Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 prevents national courts from taking decisions which run counter to a Commission decision. It does not regulate national fact-finding outside that constraint or require admitted, non-essential facts to remain contestable.

2. Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter did not require relitigation. The addressees had freely and unequivocally admitted the facts through a procedure containing safeguards for their rights of defence. They could have declined settlement, withdrawn their submissions, or challenged any failure of the statement of objections or final decision to reflect their admissions. Published facts in the settlement decision were not analogous to protected material concerning an accused person who had neither admitted nor been able to contest liability.

3. Holding the addressees to their admissions did not breach the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU. EU legislation balances public enforcement and damages claims by protecting settlement submissions from disclosure. It does not protect the admitted facts appearing in the published decision from the operation of national procedural law.

4. The Commission decision, taken as a whole, was a final decision capable of protection against collateral attack. The distinction between essential and non-essential recitals determines their binding effect under EU law. It does not divide the decision into separate final and non-final decisions for domestic abuse-of-process purposes.

5. Where the parties to the later proceedings differ, relitigation is abusive only if it would be manifestly unfair or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. This is an exceptional, high-threshold inquiry involving a broad, merits-based assessment. The Tribunal had applied that standard correctly.

6. Both limbs were satisfied. The addressees had admitted the facts with full procedural protection, secured substantial reductions in fines and benefited from a shorter decision. Requiring claimants, who faced a marked informational disadvantage, to prove those facts would create manifest unfairness and affront the administration of justice. The Tribunal properly allowed exceptions for agreed corrections, inconsistencies with underlying material, genuinely new evidence, responses to additional allegations, and other specifically justified departures.

7. No reference under Article 267 TFEU was necessary. The relevant EU-law answers were clear.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The manufacturers’ appeals were dismissed. The Tribunal’s rulings on abuse of process and its procedural gateways were upheld: [2020] EWCA Civ 1475.
2. Competition Appeal Tribunal: On a preliminary issue, the Tribunal held that essential recitals were binding under Article 16 and that contesting admitted, non-essential recitals would ordinarily be an abuse of process, subject to specified gateways: [2020] CAT 7. Permission to appeal was granted in [2020] CAT 10.