Bullale v City of Westminster Council

Under the Housing Act 1996, intentional homelessness depends on whether current homelessness remains causally connected with earlier deliberate conduct. A later period of settled, non-temporary accommodation may break that connection. Settledness is assessed as a question of fact and degree, considering all relevant circumstances and the legislative purpose. Relevant factors include tenure, expected duration, commercial context, affordability, overcrowding and the reason for taking the accommodation. A decision-maker must explain how each material factor bears on permanence and assess the factors together. Overcrowding alone does not establish temporary accommodation. The Court of Appeal also clarified that the comparison of relative precariousness in Doka v Southwark London Borough Council [2017] H.L.R. 786 was not part of that decision’s ratio.

The appellant had previously become intentionally homeless after refusing suitable accommodation offered by Hammersmith and Fulham. She later occupied a studio flat with her three daughters under an assured shorthold tenancy, followed by a periodic tenancy, for more than two years. After possession proceedings, she applied to Westminster City Council for homelessness assistance. The council decided that the later accommodation was not settled because it was overcrowded, and the review officer upheld that decision. The County Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the review officer had lawfully assessed whether the Bravington Road accommodation was settled accommodation capable of breaking the causal connection with the earlier intentional homelessness.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed. The County Court order was set aside, the review decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the respondent for reconsideration. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the County Court and Court of Appeal appeals.
2. Causation and settled accommodation. The relevant question under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 is whether current homelessness was caused by earlier deliberate conduct within section 191. The causation approach in Haile v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2015] A.C. 1471 was applied. A later involuntary event may supersede earlier conduct, and a period of settled or non-temporary accommodation may break the causal link.
3. Whether accommodation is settled is a question of fact and degree. The decision-maker must consider all relevant circumstances and bear in mind the legislative purpose. Relevant matters include the basis of occupation, the parties’ expectations, the commercial or personal nature of the arrangement, affordability, overcrowding, the context in which the accommodation was obtained, and any other relevant factor. The approach in Din v Wandsworth London Borough Council and the authorities approving it, including R v Brent London Borough Council ex p. Awua [1995] 1 A.C. 55 and Knight v Vale Royal Borough Council [2004] H.L.R. 9, was followed.
4. Doka. The ratio of Doka was that occupation must have, at its outset or during its term, a real prospect of continuing for a significant or indefinite period. The reference to comparing the precariousness of the later accommodation with the earlier accommodation was not part of the ratio and did not impose a separate legal requirement.
5. Error in the review decision. The review officer treated overcrowding as the critical factor and equated the flat’s unsuitability with temporary accommodation. She failed to analyse how overcrowding affected settledness in the particular circumstances or to relate it to the tenancy, its duration, the commercial relationship, affordability, the payment of a deposit, and the parties’ knowledge of the household composition. Overcrowding did not necessarily mean that the accommodation was temporary.
6. The Court’s appellate task was to determine whether the review officer had erred in law or on public law grounds, rather than whether the County Court judge had erred: Danesh v Kensington & Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2007] 1 W.L.R. 69. Review decisions should be read benevolently and practically, consistently with Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [2009] 1 W.L.R. 413, but the reasoning here was legally flawed and required quashing.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed. The County Court order was set aside, the review decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted to Westminster City Council.
• County Court sitting at the Mayor’s and City of London Court: HHJ Freeland QC dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the review officer’s decision on 12 December 2019.
• Review stage: The review officer upheld the decision dated 18 June 2019 that the appellant was intentionally homeless.