C (Revocation of Placement Orders)

Once leave to seek revocation of a placement order has been granted, the existing order creates no presumptive status quo. The court must determine what the child’s welfare throughout life now requires. Welfare is paramount, and permanent severance from the birth family must remain necessary and proportionate.

Every realistic care option must be evaluated by reference to its advantages, disadvantages and risks. The required detail depends on the issues and the manner in which the case is advanced. A judgment is not necessarily defective because it lacks a formally structured side-by-side comparison where its evaluation is otherwise sufficient and one option has properly been found unrealistic.

The mother appealed against HH Judge Sharpe’s dismissal in the Family Court at Liverpool of her substantive application under section 24 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to revoke placement orders concerning three children. Leave had unusually been granted by consent after the mother achieved a sustained and remarkable transformation in her life.

The judge nevertheless found that rehabilitation to the mother and her new partner was almost certain to break down, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the children and their sibling relationships. He also refused an adjournment for further work with the eldest child.

The appeal concerned whether the judge adequately evaluated risk and mitigation, compared rehabilitation with adoption, applied the statutory welfare checklist and proportionality principles, and properly refused the adjournment.

1. Appeal dismissed. Once leave to apply for revocation had been granted, there was no presumptive status quo in favour of retaining the placement orders. The court had to determine what the children’s welfare throughout their lives now required. The principles governing welfare, family preservation, necessity and proportionality in adoption cases applied to the substantive revocation application: Adoption and Children Act 2002, sections 1 and 24; article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

2. A court must ordinarily evaluate the realistic options globally and holistically, assessing their respective advantages and disadvantages and comparing them against each other. The degree of detail required depends on the circumstances and the way the case was advanced. The absence of a formally structured side-by-side analysis did not itself invalidate the decision.

3. The mother had accepted that adoption had been appropriate when the placement orders were made and that, if rehabilitation was not viable, adoption remained the preferred permanent option, subject to further scrutiny concerning the eldest child. The live issue was therefore whether rehabilitation was realistic. The judge had the benefits of family placement firmly in mind, including the mother’s exceptional progress and the principle favouring maintenance of birth-family relationships.

4. The judge was entitled on the extensive social-work and guardian evidence to find that rehabilitation carried a near certainty of breakdown and a risk of catastrophic harm, including permanent separation of the siblings. He sufficiently considered the type, likelihood and consequences of the risks and the possibility of mitigation. Against those findings, the risks and disadvantages of adoption were manifestly lower. The evaluation contained the degree of detail necessary.

5. The refusal of an adjournment was justified. The proposed work with the eldest child was insufficiently defined, the court already had enough evidence, and further delay risked confusion and loss of the prospective adoptive placement. Long-term fostering required no detailed consideration because no party had advanced it as a realistic option.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The mother’s appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Family Court’s dismissal of the revocation application was upheld: [2020] EWCA Civ 1598.
2. Family Court at Liverpool: HH Judge Sharpe dismissed the mother’s application under section 24 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to revoke the three placement orders and refused permission to appeal.