Chandran v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Where two asylum policy instructions expressly cross-refer to one another, they must be read together. A former minor dependant who turns 18 before further submissions are submitted must make an application in their own right; the policy does not preserve dependant status.

In an Article 8 proportionality assessment, administrative delay is relevant but is not determinative by itself. Its significance depends on any specific detriment caused and must be weighed with precarious immigration status, private and family life, and the public interest in effective immigration control. An appellate court will not reweigh a careful first-instance assessment merely because the appellant disputes its balance.

The appellant entered the United Kingdom in 2007 as a dependant on his mother’s asylum claim. After further representations, his mother was granted discretionary leave in 2016 without leave in line for him. He was told that, having reached adulthood, he needed to apply in his own right. His reconsidered application was refused.

At first instance, he abandoned his asylum claim and pursued Article 8, both under paragraph 276ADE and outside the Immigration Rules. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), Judge Warr, dismissed the appeal against that decision on 13 June 2019. The central issues were whether the respondent’s dependant policy preserved his status and whether administrative delay altered the Article 8 proportionality balance.

Appeal dismissed. Flaux LJ gave judgment, with Popplewell and Dingemans LJJ agreeing.

1. Policy construction. The Further Submissions and Dependants and Former Dependants policy instructions were intended to be read together. The former expressly referred to the latter, while paragraph 1.1 of the latter required that joint reading. The Further Submissions provision numbered 3.7, later 3.8, made clear that a minor child who had become 18 before further submissions were submitted had to make a first protection claim or apply for leave in their own right. The appellant was already 18 when his mother’s further submissions were submitted. The policy was therefore neither ambiguous nor applicable to preserve dependant status.
2. Delay and Article 8. Administrative delay is relevant but is not determinative in itself. Its significance depends on whether it caused specific detriment and must be assessed with all other circumstances, including the precariousness of the appellant’s status and the public interest in effective immigration control. The approach was consistent with Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 10, which recognised that protracted delay may affect the relative weight of those considerations.
3. The First-tier Tribunal had undertaken a careful balancing exercise. It considered the appellant’s private and family life, his relationship with his mother, the possibility of family life continuing in Sri Lanka, his precarious immigration status and the effect of delay. It found no specific detriment caused by the delay and that the Article 8 claim was weak. The factual findings were not open to challenge, and disagreement with the balance reached did not establish an error of law.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed the appeal from the Upper Tribunal: [2020] EWCA Civ 634.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) — Upper Tribunal Judge Warr dismissed the appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, promulgated on 13 June 2019.
• First-tier Tribunal — dismissed the appeal against the refusal of discretionary leave to remain, in a decision promulgated on 15 February 2019.