REGINA v GEORGE TWUM-BARIMA

A trial judge may use robust case management, including a limit on closing speeches, under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015. Counsel should comply with such guidance. The power must nevertheless be exercised fairly in the circumstances of the individual trial.

A conviction may be unsafe where defence counsel is unjustifiably prevented from completing a closing speech on material issues, particularly if counsel was not properly aware of a strict time limit and is criticised before the jury. An even-handed summing-up does not necessarily cure that unfairness, because judicial directions and defence advocacy perform different functions.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Woolwich of transferring or converting criminal property. The prosecution alleged that funds obtained by fraud from a church were laundered through his bank account. He denied knowledge of the transfers and relied, among other matters, on evidence concerning possible access to his electronic devices.

During the trial, defence counsel was absent when the judge discussed the expected duration of closing speeches. Counsel later learned indirectly that an hour had been contemplated. When his speech reached an hour, the judge refused a requested additional ten minutes, required him to conclude almost immediately, and criticised him before the jury.

The appeal concerned whether that restriction and criticism rendered the conviction unsafe despite the strength of the prosecution case.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial.

2. Rule 3.11(d)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 empowered a trial judge to limit the duration of any stage of the hearing. Robust and efficient case management may properly include limits on closing speeches, and counsel should comply with time guidance given in the exercise of that power.

3. However, the exercise of the power was unfair in the particular circumstances. The judge had not made clear that an hour was an absolute and inflexible maximum. Defence counsel had not been present when the discussion occurred, was unaware of the intended limit when preparing his address, and had a reasonable explanation for requesting a further ten minutes. Granting that time until the luncheon adjournment would not have materially delayed the trial.

4. The judge's refusal was unjustified. His criticism of counsel before the jury was likely to prejudice the appellant, particularly when followed by his peremptory departure from court. The appellant's counsel had been prevented from addressing several matters of potential importance, including communications relied on by the prosecution, evidence given by a co-defendant, electronic-device evidence, and good character.

5. An even-handed summing-up did not cure the defect. The judge's task in explaining the evidence differs from defence counsel's task of persuading the jury to view it favourably and counterbalancing the prosecution's advocacy. The court could not say that the omitted matters might not have had a material impact on the jury's deliberations, especially as one co-defendant had been acquitted. The conviction was therefore unsafe.

6. A fresh indictment was directed under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015. It was to be served within 28 days, with re-arraignment within two months. The appellant was granted unconditional bail pending retrial. A temporary reporting restriction was made under the Contempt of Court Act 1981.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2020] EWCA Crim 1009, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a retrial.

• Crown Court at Woolwich: The appellant was convicted on 30 July 2019 of an offence contrary to section 327 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.