Stickells, R. v

When reducing sentence for a guilty plea under section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court must assess when and in what circumstances the offender first indicated an intention to plead guilty. The absence of a charge does not automatically preserve maximum credit until that charge is added. A plea at a plea and trial-preparation hearing does not invariably attract 25 per cent credit. A proactive offer to plead guilty to an unusual new charge may justify increased credit, but full credit remains unwarranted if the offer could reasonably have been made earlier. A sentencing appeal nevertheless fails where the final sentence, considered overall, is not manifestly excessive despite an error in calculating plea credit.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at Canterbury to theft and taking a conveyance without authority. After changing representation, he offered to plead guilty to a newly added count of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship contrary to section 76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015. He received 28 months’ imprisonment on that count, concurrent with two-month sentences on the other counts.

He appealed against sentence. He contended that he should have received full credit for his guilty plea to the new count and that insufficient weight had been given to mitigation. The central issue was the proper reduction for a plea to an offence not originally charged, and whether the resulting overall sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court refused permission to advance the mitigation ground and dismissed the appeal against the 28-month sentence.

2. Section 144(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 makes the timing and circumstances of the first indication of an intention to plead guilty decisive. Applying R v Caley [2012] EWCA Crim 2821, the first reasonable opportunity normally arises before a plea and trial-preparation hearing. A reduction of about a quarter at that hearing is usual only where an earlier indication could reasonably have been given.

3. The fact that the offence was not yet charged did not entitle the appellant to retain full credit until the prosecution added it. As R v Wacha [2013] EWCA Crim 1108 illustrated, an offender may indicate a willingness to admit a lesser or different offence, or invite discussion of the proper charge, before formal amendment of the indictment. The appellant could have offered to plead guilty to controlling or coercive behaviour earlier.

4. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge’s approach was too simple. The new count was not a conventional alternative to false imprisonment, the appellant had admitted many relevant facts, and his offer was proactive. Those matters justified a reduction of at least 25 per cent rather than 20 per cent. Full credit was not required because the offer could have been made earlier.

5. The error did not make the sentence manifestly excessive. The court considered R v Dalgarno [2020] EWCA Crim 290 as a material sentencing comparison. Even allowing a 30 per cent reduction, the 28-month sentence represented a pre-credit sentence of three years and four months, which was well within the available range for this prolonged and serious category 1A offending. The judge had also taken account of the relevant mitigation and aggravating features.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against sentence: [2020] EWCA Crim 1212.
• Crown Court at Canterbury — sentenced the appellant to 28 months’ imprisonment for controlling or coercive behaviour, concurrent with two-month sentences for theft and taking a conveyance without authority. The prosecution offered no evidence on the false-imprisonment count and a not-guilty verdict was entered.