Bassett v R.

Where a conviction depends on circumstantial evidence, a jury may draw logical inferences only if it can exclude all realistic possibilities consistent with innocence. Conduct after an accidental shooting could not prove earlier possession of a firearm when it remained realistically explicable by shock and fear following the shooting. The no-case submission should therefore have succeeded.

When only some convictions are quashed, an appellate court may resentence for the surviving related offences, provided that the aggregate sentence is not more severe. On breach of a suspended sentence order, the court must take a statutory course of action and cannot simply take no action.

The appellant shot and killed his friend in a flat in Coventry. He pleaded guilty to gross negligence manslaughter and possessing a prohibited firearm after the shooting. A jury acquitted him of murder but convicted him of possessing the firearm before the shooting with intent to endanger life.

At Warwick Crown Court, the judge rejected a submission of no case to answer on the latter count. The prosecution relied on the appellant’s conduct after the shooting, including threats, removal of the firearm and ammunition, and their disposal. He appealed against that conviction and sentence.

The central issue was whether the post-shooting conduct could safely establish possession before arrival at the flat, despite the realistic possibility that it resulted from panic after an accidental discharge.

1. The court allowed the appeal against conviction on count 1 and quashed that conviction. The judge correctly recognised that later events can sometimes support an inference about an earlier state of affairs. However, a jury could only convict on circumstantial evidence if it could exclude all realistic possibilities consistent with innocence.

2. The appellant’s conduct after the shooting was capable of reflecting panic, shock and fear of the consequences of accidentally shooting his friend. That explanation could not properly be excluded. The jury could not safely conclude that the only inference from his conduct was that he possessed the firearm before entering the flat. R v Banfield [2013] EWCA Crim 1394 was factually distinct and did not determine the issue.

3. The original extended sentence on count 1 consequently fell away. Under section 4(3) of the Criminal Appeals Act 1968, the court could resentence on the surviving related counts provided that the total sentence was not made more severe.

4. The manslaughter was recategorised as category A gross negligence manslaughter. The negligent conduct occurred in the context of other serious criminality and showed blatant disregard of a very high risk of death. A sentence of 15 years before credit for the guilty plea was appropriate, producing a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.

5. The basis on which dangerousness had been found no longer applied. On the breach of the suspended sentence order, the court held that it could not take no action. It activated the full 13-month suspended sentence consecutively. The five-year sentence for possession of the prohibited firearm remained concurrent. The resulting total sentence was 11 years and one month; ancillary orders were unchanged.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Allowed the renewed appeal against conviction, quashed the count 1 conviction, and resentenced on the surviving counts: [2020] EWCA Crim 1376.
• Warwick Crown Court The appellant pleaded guilty to gross negligence manslaughter and possession of a prohibited firearm. The jury acquitted him of murder but convicted him of possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life. He received an extended sentence of 23 years on that count, with concurrent sentences on the other counts.