Steele, R. v

When sentencing an offender with a mental disorder, the court must make an individual assessment of its effect on culpability and of the particular burden of the proposed sentence. A diagnosis and some causal connection do not automatically displace higher culpability where the connection to the offending is weak when weighed against powerful aggravating factors. However, where mental disorder, addiction, age and mitigation materially reduce the just sentence, that reduction must be reflected in the final term. A sentence may be manifestly excessive if the sentencing judge gives those matters insufficient weight.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Birmingham Crown Court to aggravated burglary contrary to section 10(1) of the Theft Act 1968. He and a co-accused entered an occupied home at night. The appellant assaulted one occupant, while the co-accused used a machete and injured another.

The judge treated the offence as Category 1 offending and imposed six years and eight months’ imprisonment after guilty-plea credit. The appellant appealed his sentence. He contended that the judge had failed properly to reflect his personality disorder, alcohol dependency and age, had double-counted aggravating features, and had failed to maintain sufficient disparity from the co-accused’s sentence.

The central issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive despite the seriousness and higher culpability of the offending.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the sentence of six years and eight months’ imprisonment and substituted five years and four months. The restraining order and all other elements of sentence remained unchanged.

2. The judge was entitled to find greater harm and higher culpability. The burglary was of an occupied home, violence was threatened and used, and the appellant knew that a weapon would be available for the joint enterprise. His attempts to obtain the address, the group action and the revenge motive supported the finding that the home and its occupants were deliberately targeted. Category 1 offending, with a starting point of ten years’ custody, was therefore justified.

3. The court applied the individualised sentencing approach set out in R v PS [2019] EWCA Crim 2286 and R v Edwards [2018] EWCA Crim 595. A sentencer must consider both whether psychiatric conditions reduced culpability and whether custody would bear more heavily on the particular offender. The appellant was not psychotic at the time, could form the required intent, and the medical evidence did not establish a connection strong enough to displace higher culpability.

4. Nevertheless, the personality disorder and alcohol dependency contributed to impulsivity and poor emotional management. The judge had not made a sufficient downward adjustment for those matters, the appellant’s age and his effective previous good character. Although some aggravating factors justified an increase from the guideline starting point, a pre-credit term of ten years was manifestly excessive. Eight years before guilty-plea credit was just and proportionate.

5. The disparity ground had no merit. The co-accused deployed the machete, but the appellant knew and intended that it would be used, instigated the revenge attack, and personally inflicted violence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)—allowed the sentence appeal, quashed the custodial term and substituted five years and four months’ imprisonment: [2020] EWCA Crim 1694.
• Birmingham Crown Court—on 21 November 2019, imposed six years and eight months’ imprisonment following a guilty plea to aggravated burglary. No citation for the Crown Court decision was stated.