W, R. v

Where a jury acquits a defendant of murder but convicts him of manslaughter, sentencing must give effect to the manslaughter verdict and the applicable manslaughter guideline. For offenders aged 15 to 17, the court may apply a sentence broadly within half to two-thirds of the adult sentence, while giving at least equal importance to emotional and developmental maturity. The individual circumstances remain paramount. An appellate court should not interfere with an allegedly unduly lenient sentence where the sentencing judge has carefully balanced aggravating and mitigating factors, selected an adult sentence above the guideline starting point, and applied an age reduction that was open under the youth sentencing guideline.

The Solicitor General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, alleging that it was unduly lenient. The offender, aged 16 at the time of the offence, had been convicted after trial of manslaughter and acquitted of murder. The Central Criminal Court imposed seven years and six months’ detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, with no separate penalty for assault.

The issue was whether the sentencing judge had failed adequately to reflect the aggravating features of the offence or had applied too great a reduction for the offender’s age.

Leave refused. The sentence could not be characterised as unduly lenient.

1. The sentencing judge had carefully assessed the facts, the aggravating and mitigating features, and the relevant sentencing guidelines. The judge was entitled to assess the appropriate adult sentence at 12½ years’ custody. That figure was above the 12-year starting point for category B manslaughter and took account of the seriousness of the offending.
2. The judge was also entitled not to treat the offender’s previous conviction for violence as an aggravating factor. The earlier offence involved materially different violence, arose in different circumstances, and had been committed when the offender was much younger.
3. The Guideline relating to Sentencing Children and Young People indicated that, by reference to the adult guideline, a sentence broadly between half and two-thirds of the adult sentence might be appropriate for offenders aged 15 to 17. Emotional and developmental age and maturity were at least as important as chronological age, and the individual factors relating to the offence and the young person were of greatest importance. A 40% reduction was therefore within the judge’s proper sentencing discretion.
4. The judge’s observation that the conduct was as close to murder as manslaughter could be did not permit sentencing as though there had been a murder conviction. It was the judge’s judicial obligation to give effect to the jury’s acquittal of murder and conviction of manslaughter, with appropriate regard to the Definitive Guideline on Manslaughter. The judge had done so. The Court of Appeal refused leave to refer the sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On the Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court held that the sentence was not unduly lenient and refused leave: [2020] EWCA Crim 1727.
• Central Criminal Court: Judge Lickley QC imposed seven years and six months’ detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 following the offender’s conviction for manslaughter.