Rodi, R. v

In sentencing manslaughter by diminished responsibility, the court must assess the responsibility retained by the offender, rather than treating the existence of mental illness as determinative. A voluntary failure to follow treatment may increase retained responsibility, although the effect of the disorder on self-control and engagement with services remains relevant.

A life sentence remains a sentence of last resort. It may nevertheless be justified where the offence’s seriousness, relevant antecedents, risk to the public, likely duration of danger and available alternatives support it. Where a penal element is appropriate, a hospital and limitation direction under Mental Health Act 1983 section 45A may properly accompany a life sentence.

The applicant pleaded guilty at Leeds Crown Court to the manslaughter by diminished responsibility of his former wife, whom he had strangled. The sentencing judge imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of 10 years, less time spent on remand, and made a hospital direction and limitation direction under Mental Health Act 1983 section 45A.

The applicant had a severe depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms. The psychiatric evidence differed over whether his voluntary disengagement from medication and mental-health services was caused by his illness. He sought permission to appeal out of time, contending that a hospital order should have been imposed, that a life sentence was unjustified, and that the term was manifestly excessive.

The central issues were the level of responsibility he retained, the proper application of dangerousness sentencing under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the appropriateness of a hybrid mental-health disposal.

1. The court granted the extension of time but refused leave to appeal. The sentencing judge was entitled to impose life imprisonment with a section 45A hospital and limitation direction.

2. The judge correctly applied the Sentencing Council guideline for manslaughter by diminished responsibility. Diminished responsibility reduces, but does not extinguish, criminal responsibility. The assessment at step 1 concerns the responsibility retained, having regard to the circumstances of the killing and medical evidence. Voluntary non-compliance with medical advice may increase responsibility, but the court must also consider whether the disorder affected the offender’s self-control or ability to engage with treatment.

3. The judge was entitled to find a high level of retained responsibility. He permissibly preferred the evidence that the applicant knowingly stopped medication and support when not symptomatic, despite appreciating the risk of relapse and escalating violence. The aggravating history of strangulation, abuse and coercive behaviour justified an increase from the guideline starting point. The resulting notional term of 30 years was not manifestly excessive.

4. A life sentence is a last resort. Applying the considerations identified in Attorney General’s Reference No 27 of 2013 (Burinskas) [2014] EWCA Crim 334, the court held that the sentencing remarks as a whole adequately addressed seriousness, antecedents, public danger, the likely duration of risk and alternative sentences. They provided a proper basis for a life sentence.

5. The judge also had the relevant approach, including that in Edwards and others [2018] EWCA Crim 595, in mind when considering the mental-health disposal. There was sufficient evidence that a penal element was required and that treatment could appropriately be addressed by a hybrid direction under Mental Health Act 1983 section 45A.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Granted a 162-day extension of time but refused leave to appeal against sentence: [2020] EWCA Crim 330.
• Crown Court at Leeds — The applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter by diminished responsibility and received life imprisonment with a 10-year minimum term, less 251 days on remand, plus a hospital direction and limitation direction under Mental Health Act 1983 section 45A.