Dunford, R. v

An extension of time for a sentencing appeal may properly be refused where there is very substantial delay and the proposed appeal has no substantive merit. An appellate court will not interfere with a minimum term where the sentencing judge correctly identifies the governing principles, fairly assesses aggravating and mitigating factors, and the term is neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

The applicant was sentenced on 15 April 2016 to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 13 years after pleading guilty to the murder of her seven-month-old son. She had previously been convicted of the manslaughter of her daughter and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.

More than three years out of time, she renewed an application for leave to appeal her sentence. Her grounds relied principally on mental-health and learning difficulties, guilt, the circumstances of her plea, a wish for hospital treatment, and the original recorded cause of death. The central issue was whether an extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence should be granted.

1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence was refused.

2. The applicant’s submissions largely challenged her conviction rather than her sentence. She did not seek to appeal the conviction. Her final guilty plea was unequivocal and was entered after an adjournment to obtain further advice from counsel.

3. Given that the applicant was unrepresented and had learning difficulties, the court considered whether any arguable sentencing ground arose beyond those advanced by her. None did. The sentencing judge had correctly identified and applied the relevant principles, and had fairly assessed the aggravating and mitigating factors.

4. The judge gave due weight to the guilty plea, the applicant’s confession, her mental-health difficulties and her low IQ. He also had to sentence the murder of an infant in the applicant’s care, followed by the concealment of the crime for years. The 13-year minimum term was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

5. The effective period before the Parole Board could consider release reflected both the earlier offence and the murder sentence. In light of the very considerable delay and the absence of substantive merit, the interests of justice did not require an extension of time.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2020] EWCA Crim 573, refused an extension of time and renewed leave to appeal against the minimum term.

• Crown Court: On 15 April 2016, sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 13 years following her guilty plea to murder.